제 목: 미 의회 대표 버먼 방한 관련 무대 연출

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001241 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019 
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations],
KS [Korea (South)], KN [Korea (North)] 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR CODEL BERMAN'S VISIT TO KOREA 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Mark A. Tokola. 
Reasons 1.4 (b), 
 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  CODEL Berman, welcome to Korea.  The 
alliance between the U.S. and the Republic of Korea (ROK) is 
strong, enduring, and strategically important.  Your visit 
follows the successful June 16 U.S.-ROK Presidential Summit 
and adoption of the Joint Vision Statement.  The Joint Vision 
Statement was well-received here, both for its recommitment 
to a continued strengthening of our security relationship 
(including its affirmation of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and 
extended deterrence to the ROK), and for outlining what a 
21st century U.S.-ROK relationship entails.  To realize this 
vision, we will need to continue to expand our cooperation, 
both regionally and globally.  Security in the region, 
particularly in view of North Korea,s continued belligerent 
posture and Kim Jong-Il,s declining health, is important to 
Korean officials.  Like us, the ROK supports the Six Party 
Talks and remains adamant that we should not recognize North 
Korea as a nuclear state.  Your South Korean interlocutors 
are very interested in how you view the proposed North Korean 
contingency plan, and prospects for denuclearizing North 
Korea. 
 
¶2. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents 
for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. 
(KORUS) FTA in Washington.  Ratification of the FTA is seen 
as a sign of America's strategic commitment in northeast 
Asia.  President Obama's statement at the April G20 meeting 
with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find a way forward on the 
KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety in Seoul, and enabled 
Lee to push the FTA through the committee of jurisdiction in 
Korea,s National Assembly in late April.  A full plenary 
vote in the National Assembly has not been scheduled; while 
opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA continues to receive about 
a 60 percent approval Korean public opinion polls, is 
strongly supported by the majority GNP party, and is expected 
to pass once there is some sign of movement in Washington. 
The Obama Administration is conducting a thorough review of 
the KORUS FTA and consulting closely with all stakeholders to 
understand the exact nature of their concerns, and to develop 
recommendations for addressing them.  To assist with this 
review, and to ensure that all who may have an interest in 
this free trade agreement are able to fully express their 
views, we issued a Federal Register Notice on July 27, 2009, 
requesting comments on the KORUS FTA.  End Summary. 
 
---------- 
BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶3. (C) The ROK, with its vibrant democracy, free market, 
high-tech economy, highly educated population, free press, 
and ever-deepening people-to-people ties with the United 
States, is a striking success story, including for U.S. 
foreign policy.  Our intensive engagement with the ROK since 
its founding in 1948 exemplifies the importance of all three 
pillars Secretary Clinton has outlined describing U.S. 
foreign policy:  defense, diplomacy, and development.  South 
Korea's success is based on a shared commitment to defense, 
as shown by the 28,500 U.S. troops still on the Peninsula, 
the substantial development assistance the U.S. provided 
after the Korean War, and our close diplomatic cooperation to 
achieve a denuclearized North Korea and a more secure and 
prosperous future for the region. 
 
¶4. (C) Now a developed country with a tested democratic 
system, South Korea increasingly has the capability as well 
as the political will to assume larger regional and global 
roles.  Your visit will encourage your interlocutors to 
become even more active partners with us on issues ranging 
from human rights promotion to climate change to sea piracy 
to counter-terrorism.  We share values and strategic goals 
with this highly capable ally; we need to give substance to 
our shared aspiration to upgrade our bilateral relationship, 
making it a global partnership. 
 
---------------------- 
The Domestic Situation 
---------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) President Lee, of the center-right Grand National 
Party (GNP), began his single five-year term in February 
2008, ending ten years of center-left control of the 
Presidency.  In April 2008 the GNP won a solid majority over 
the main opposition Democratic Party (DP) in the unicameral 
National Assembly.  The GNP's success at the polls, however, 
belied the lack of consensus among the South Korean public on 
domestic political issues like media law reform, labor relations, 
tax policy, and education.  President Lee has 
struggled with low approval ratings -- about 30 percent -- 
since taking office, especially following his decision to 
re-open the Korean market to U.S. beef last year.  In the 
National Assembly, the GNP and DP have even lower approval 
ratings than President Lee, resulting in a virtually 
deadlocked domestic agenda. 
 
¶6. (C) President Lee has remained publicly disengaged from 
the squabbling in the National Assembly and is focusing 
instead on foreign policy, resource diplomacy, and 
international cooperative efforts on green growth, climate 
change, and overcoming the economic crisis.  He campaigned on 
a pledge to strengthen the U.S.-ROK alliance, and is widely 
seen as having been successful.  With China and Russia, he 
has substantially expanded the ROK's economic and political 
ties.  He has attempted to overcome historical animosities 
with Japan to advance Korea-Japan ties based on Korea's 
pragmatic interests, but sensitivities to Japan's 
colonization of Korea run deep.  Looking wider, President Lee 
is actively cultivating new ties with Southeast Asia, Central 
Asia, and Europe. 
 
¶7. (C) Former President Kim Dae-jung's health has been 
failing and he is currently hospitalized in Seoul in 
intensive care.  The prognosis for President Kim, who was in 
office 1998-2003 and who is 84, is not good. 
 
------------ 
The Alliance 
------------ 
 
¶8. (C) For over half a century the U.S.-ROK alliance has 
provided the foundation for peace and prosperity in Northeast 
Asia.  The ROK has benefitted greatly; neither the economic 
"Miracle on the Han" nor Korea,s democratic flowering would 
have been possible absent a U.S. defense shield and economic 
assistance and support.  The U.S. too has benefited.  USFK 
(U.S. Forces in Korea) is our only troop presence in mainland 
East Asia, and South Korea contributes billions of dollars to 
USFK operating expenses. 
 
¶9. (C) The Summit Joint Vision Statement offers a compelling 
vision of expanding the role of the U.S.-ROK alliance 
regionally and globally.  On the Korean Peninsula, we are 
also working to strengthen, further broaden, and 
appropriately evolve the security relationship by 
implementing three key bilateral transformation agreements 
known as YRP, LPP and STP. 
 
-- YRP:  The Yongsan Relocation Plan will relocate the 
headquarters of U.S. Forces (USFK) from the middle of Seoul 
to a new, purpose-built war-fighting headquarters south of 
the city, thereby giving back to the Koreans a large tract of 
land historically associated with Japanese occupation which 
they plan to turn into a central park.  Progress on the 
implementation of YRP continues but construction to prepare 
U.S. Army Garrison ) Humphreys, the hub for the relocation, 
continues on schedule but faces obstacles that require 
President Lee,s and his administration,s support if we are 
to meet the agreed 2014 completion date. 
 
-- LPP:  The Land Partnership Plan will consolidate over 100 
U.S. military bases spread all across Korea into two key 
strategic hubs south of the Han River, replacing an outdated 
military footprint from the end of the Korean War with a 
modern and better-positioned force posture.  The ROK Ministry 
of National Defense (MND) seeks to complete the LPP by the 
end of 2015. 
 
-- STP: The Strategic Transition Plan is the process under 
which we are transferring wartime operational control (OPCON) 
of South Korean forces from the U.S. military to the ROK 
military by April 17, 2012.  President Lee has emphasized the 
need to keep the spotlight off of wartime OPCON transition 
due to increased scrutiny by ROK domestic opposition groups 
regarding the April 17, 2012 transition date (in the wake of 
North Korea,s recent claimed nuclear test).  We are 
continuing to emphasize the process for close cooperation in 
reviewing OPCON transition progress through the SCM and 
management of messaging and public perceptions to highlight 
the value of the restructuring. 
 
¶10. (C) We must continue to emphasize the importance of 
completing the two relocation elements of USFK 
transformation, YRP and LPP.  Those agreements, signed in 
2004, did not come with appropriated funds.  The Master Plan, 
finished in 2007, lays out the cost and timeline but the ROKG 
has yet to request funding from the National Assembly.  Other 
U.S. and ROK private sector initiatives are failing to fill 
the funding gap.  As a result, alliance transformation, which 
was originally scheduled for completion in 2008, is facing a 
delay of many more years.  To avoid further delays, the ROKG 
must make implementation of these moves a priority.  For our 
part, we must be clear and consistent in identifying our own 
top priorities . 
 
¶11. (C).  The time is right to expand the areas in which the 
U.S. and the ROK cooperate on global security issues.  You 
may want to raise the following areas where the ROK may be 
ready to increase its global security role: 
 
-- Afghanistan:  The ROKG is planning to provide more 
assistance and training in Afghanistan, including building a 
new hospital and a training center in Bagram, and 
contributing ambulances, motorcycles, and police trainers. 
However, we need a lot more from the ROK, especially 
financial support for the Afghan Army, for which we have 
requested USD 100 million a year for five years, which is the 
USG primary request of the ROK.  The ROKG also is considering 
sending a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) to 
Afghanistan, which we would welcome, but we also have 
insisted that any such PRT include a military unit to provide 
for its own security.  Such a deployment (the PRT as well as 
any other military assets, such as an ISR unit ) 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) will need 
National Assembly approval, which will pose difficult, but 
not insurmountable, political problems for President Lee. 
 
-- UN Peacekeeping Operations:  The National Assembly is 
deliberating on a bill that will allow the ROK military to be 
deployed for peacekeeping missions without prior legislative 
approval.  In the meantime, the National Assembly in July 
approved extending the ROK,s PKO deployment in Lebanon until 
the end of December 2010.  The ROK has contributed 367 
soldiers for peacekeeping in Lebanon since 2007 and is 
participating in eight other PKO operations around the world. 
 As of January 1, 2008 the ROK was the 10th largest provider 
of assessed contributions to the UN PKO budget. 
 
-- Combating Piracy off Somalia:  The ROK is a member of the 
Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia. 
Additionally, the ROKG deployed a 4,500 ton class destroyer 
equipped with a Lynx helicopter and rigid inflatable craft to 
the Gulf of Aden to be part of the maritime security 
operations of the combined maritime forces.  The destroyer 
carries up to 310 personnel. 
 
-- Proliferation Security Initiative:  In response to the 
DPRK,s May rocket launch and nuclear test, the ROK on May 26 
joined the U.S.-initiated Proliferation Security Initiative 
(PSI).   In June the ROK participated in a PSI meeting in 
Poland, and held a workshop in Seoul in July.  The ROKG plans 
to attend the next workshop in Sydney in September, and has 
expressed interest in attending the interdiction exercises in 
Singapore in October.  PSI is an international, interagency 
effort aimed at preventing or interdicting the proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction using existing domestic laws 
and established international agreements.  The ROKG currently 
is formulating an interagency strategy for its effective PSI 
participation. 
 
--------------------------- 
U.S.-ROK Global Partnership 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) The ROK also wants to play a bigger role on other 
global issues and the following are good areas for increased 
cooperation: 
 
-- Democracy and Human Rights: The ROK has demonstrated a new 
readiness to address human rights concerns in the DPRK, 
co-sponsoring the annual UNGA North Korea human rights 
resolution in 2008 for the first time.  In October 2008 the 
ROK agreed to chair the first Senior Officials' Meeting of 
the Asia-Pacific Democracy Partnership, a U.S.-supported 
regional subset of the Community of Democracies. 
 
-- Climate Change:  Korea, the 13th largest per capita 
emitter of greenhouse gases and the world,s 15th largest 
economy in terms of GDP, is playing a constructive role in 
discussions on global climate change.  The ROKG shares the 
U.S. view that that investment in new and renewable energy 
sources not only can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, but 
also can create jobs, spur economic growth, and enhance 
energy security. The U.S. Department of Energy is engaged in 
a variety of collaborative R&D activities with Korea, 
including in nuclear energy, fusion, gas hydrates, 
"smart grids," and other new and renewable energy technologies, but 
there is room to expand and strengthen our cooperation. 
 
-- Development Assistance:  Korea's overseas development 
assistance program currently includes nearly USD 500 million 
in Official Development Assistance (ODA), as well as a 
roughly similar figure for North Korea (suspended).  The ROKG 
target is to triple ODA (as a percentage of GDP) by 2015. 
With limited functional and regional capacity, Korea should 
be receptive to policy discussions on ODA coordination. 
 
-- Counter-Proliferation:  The ROKG has told Iranian 
counterparts at every opportunity that Tehran's uranium 
enrichment activities are unacceptable and has supported the 
P5-plus-1 incentives package. 
 
----------------------- 
FTA and Economic Issues 
----------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) President Lee has faced criticism from his opponents 
for his inability to generate momentum for the Korea-U.S. 
(KORUS) FTA in Washington.  President Obama's statement at 
the April G20 meeting with Lee, that the U.S. wanted to find 
a way forward on the KORUS FTA, allayed some of the anxiety 
in Seoul, and enabled Lee to push the FTA through the 
committee of jurisdiction in Korea,s National Assembly in 
late April.  A full plenary vote in the National Assembly has 
not been scheduled; while opponents are vocal, the KORUS FTA 
continues to receive about a 60 percent approval Korean 
public opinion polls, is strongly supported by the majority 
GNP party, and is expected to pass once there is some sign of 
movement in Washington.  The Obama Administration is 
conducting a thorough review of the KORUS FTA and consulting 
closely with all stakeholders to understand the exact nature 
of their concerns, to develop recommendations for addressing 
them.  To assist with this review, and to ensure that all who 
may have an interest in this free trade agreement are able to 
fully express their views, we issued a Federal Register 
Notice on July 27, 2009, requesting comments on the KORUS FTA. 
 
¶14. (C) Korea is our seventh largest trading partner, with 
total merchandise trade in 2008 of over USD 82 billion (and 
more than USD 100 billion if services are included).  The 
U.S. International Trade Commission estimated in September 
2007 that U.S. merchandise exports to Korea would expand by 
USD 10-12 billion on an annual basis as a result of the FTA 
and that services exports would also expand.  The United 
States has traditionally been the ROK's biggest trading 
partner in the post-WWII era.  One tangible sign of China's 
growing importance in Asia and in Korea, however, is that 
China displaced the United States as Korea's top trading 
partner in 2004.  By 2008, China-ROK merchandise trade 
reached USD 168 billion, doubling the U.S.-ROK total.  With 
respect to North Korea, China accounts for nearly 50 percent 
of that country's total trade.  The growing economic and 
political role of China on the Korean peninsula is one of the 
most important motivations for Korea to enter into FTA 
negotiations with the United States.  Successive ROK 
Governments have seen the ratification and implementation of 
the KORUS FTA as symbolic of the U.S. will to remain fully 
engaged in Northeast Asia in the face of increasing Chinese 
influence. 
 
¶15. (C) Korea also wants to conclude an FTA with the United 
States because Korean economic reformers recognize that the 
Korean economy needs to liberalize and open in order to 
promote greater competitiveness vis--vis China and Japan. 
South Korea has concluded a number of FTAs and launched 
negotiations on others since the signing of the KORUS FTA 
negotiations on June 30, 2007.  The ROK has implemented FTAs 
with Chile, Singapore, EFTA, and ASEAN (except investment). 
The ROK has concluded negotiations with India and signing is 
reportedly imminent.  Negotiations are underway with Canada, 
Mexico, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Australia, New Zealand, 
and Peru.  In July, the ROKG announced that negotiations on 
the EU-Korea FTA were concluded (but the agreement is not yet 
signed).  ROK media have been filled with stories of the 
increasing economic weight of Europe in Korea as a result of 
the FTA.  The Board of Governors of the American Chamber of 
Commerce has expressed concern that the EU-Korea FTA will 
disadvantage the competitiveness of U.S. firms vis--vis 
their European competitors in Korea. 
 
¶16. (C) The reopening of the beef market was accomplished in 
an April 2008 agreement separate from the FTA.  Under this 
agreement, the United States and Korea agreed to reopen 
Korea,s market to U.S. beef and beef products in a manner 
fully consistent with international standards and science. 
In June 2008, following massive street protests in Seoul, 
U.S. beef exporters and Korean beef importers reached a 
temporary commercial agreement to only export beef and beef 
products from cattle under 30 months of age, as a 
transitional measure, until Korean consumer confidence 
improves.  While beef sales have not yet returned to past 
levels due to Korea,s currency exchange fluctuations, 
increased competition from Australian beef, and lingering 
public concerns about the safety of U.S. beef, the market is 
open and we expect increased sales over the medium term. 
Korea is also watching closely our ongoing negotiations with 
other countries that have stricter restrictions on U.S. beef. 
 
¶17. (C) On the global financial reform discussions, Korea is 
a strong ally in the G-20 process (which it will chair in 
2010).  Korea is enthusiastic about the G20 as the global 
forum for action on the global financial system.  The ROKG is 
concerned that European countries are advocating other 
formulas for such discussions that would exclude Korea. 
Within the G20, President Lee has called for a strong fiscal 
response and refraining from protectionism as well as 
necessary regulatory improvements.  President Lee Myung-bak 
has strongly argued that it would be premature to withdraw 
the national fiscal stimulus packages at this juncture. 
Korea sees itself as lining up on the U.S. side on almost all 
G20 debates. 
 
¶18. (C) The Korean economy is looking better and is 
increasingly forecast to be one of the first major economies 
to emerge from recession.  The benchmark KOSPI stock index in 
early August reached the highest level since mid-August 2008 
and the won, the Korean currency, closed at 1218 per dollar 
on August 4, the strongest level since October 14, 2008. 
Most analysts foresee further strengthening of the won in the 
months ahead.  The picture looked far different last fall, 
when the financial crisis hit Korea hard.  A USD 30 billion 
swap line extended by the U.S. Federal Reserve in October, as 
the Korean won was plummeting and Korea looked to be on the 
brink of a financial panic, helped Korea weather the worst of 
the storm, and gained tremendous gratitude.  The later 
Japanese and Chinese swap mechanisms did not have the same 
impact.  In the closing months of 2008 Korea experienced 
dramatic contraction of demand for its exports.  The ROKG's 
stabilization and stimulus packages mitigated the impact and 
the weakened currency has generated a significant current 
account surplus in recent months.  Sectors of the Korean 
economy facing restructuring challenges include construction, 
shipbuilding, shipping and automotive.  GM Daewoo, GM,s 
Korean subsidiary, is negotiating with the Korea Development 
Bank for a sizeable loanto restructure its operations. 
 
----------- 
North Korea 
----------- 
 
¶19. (C) Presidents Obama and Lee agreed to send a clear 
message to North Korea that its provocations come at a price. 
 They also agreed on principles to deal with North Korea's 
nuclear and missile threats, including commitments to 
achieving the "complete and verifiable elimination" of North 
Korea's nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs as well 
as the ballistic missile program.  Korean officials continue 
to seek assurances that the United States will consult 
closely with the ROK on its North Korea policy and that the 
United States will not recognize North Korea as a nuclear 
state. 
 
¶20. (C) North Korea policy is almost always the most 
sensitive issue on the South Korean agenda.  Fifty-five years 
of alliance notwithstanding, the ROKG still fears being left 
out or surprised by Washington's initiatives or policy 
changes on North Korea.  Simply put, the ROKG must be seen by 
South Koreans as being informed and consulted on all USG 
moves on North Korea.  Korean officials see Washington and 
Seoul as partners in forming and implementing policies toward 
the North and consistently seek affirmation that Washington 
will not allow Pyongyang to drive a wedge between us. 
 
¶21. (C) There is virtually no chance of early improvement in 
South-North relations; President Lee is determined to stick 
to principle and to insist on a more reciprocal relationship 
with the North, and Kim Jong-il will not give in for his own 
domestic reasons.  Importantly, South Koreans appear tired 
of, but not particularly bothered by, the continuing 
threatening rhetoric from the North, and therefore seem 
largely comfortable with their government's stance. 
Heightening tensions in the West Sea and missile launches 
have created less public anxiety than might be expected.  The 
ROKG will welcome the opportunity to present with you a 
united front of calm and determination toward the North, 
combined with a call to return to the Six- Party Talks. 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC) is the only 
remaining joint economic project between North and South 
Korea.   (The other joint venture, Mt. Kumkang tours, was 
closed on July 11, 2008, after North Korean security forces 
shot a South Korean tourist to death.)  Located in North 
Korea, six miles north of the DMZ, the KIC opened in December 
2004 and is home to 106 ROK-owned factories employing 
approximately 40,000 North Korean workers (84 percent are 
women age 20-39).  Since late 2008, North-South tensions 
regarding the KIC have increased.  The DPRK closed the border 
temporarily on multiple occasions, and has placed limits on 
the number of South Korean employees allowed in the KIC.  The 
DPRK is demanding drastically higher wages for employees (up 
from USD 55 to USD 300 per month), construction of additional 
dormitories and an additional fee of USD 500 million for land 
usage. 
 
¶23. (SBU) North Koreans detained a South Korean Hyundai Asan 
employee working at KIC on March 30, accusing him of defaming 
North Korea and attempting to suborn a North Korean female 
worker.  In addition to securing the release of the ROK 
citizen, South Korea's priorities at the KIC include 
guaranteeing employee safety, freedom of access and 
border-crossing, and increasing the number of North Korean 
workers brought in from outside the Kaesong area.  Although 
the South Korean firms at KIC are concerned about the current 
tension and complain of financial losses, only one company 
has withdrawn from KIC to date. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The DPRK and the ROK have held four rounds of 
negotiations between April and July 2009 without any 
breakthrough, with the most recent session taking place on 
July 2.  Both sides appear to be committed to continuing KIC 
operations.  The United States has consistently supported 
North-South dialogue and expressed hope that the two sides 
will resolve their disputes over the KIC. 
 
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VWP/WEST 
-------- 
 
¶25. (U)  The ROK was included in the the Visa Waiver Program 
(VWP) in October 2008. This step has been a success in 
facilitating travel and improving people-to-people ties 
between nations.  As of the beginning of July, approximately 
200,000 Koreans had applied for VWP approval using the ESTA 
(Electronic Approval for Travel Authorization).  More than 99 
percent of the ESTA applications have been approved and we 
continue to see an upward trend in ESTA usage. 
 
¶26. (U)  The WEST (Work, English Study, and Travel) program, 
inaugurated in March 2009, allows qualifying college students 
and recent graduates to enter the U.S. for up to 18 months on 
J-1 exchange visitor visas that allow them to study English, 
participate in professional-level internships and travel 
independently.  A group of 185 Korean students have already 
travelled to the U.S. on the WEST program and a second wave 
of 159 is preparing to depart.  As of December 2008, there 
were 110,000 South Koreans studying in the U.S. at all 
levels, from elementary to graduate school.  According to 
Korean Ministry of Education data for 2007, 27% of all 
post-graduate students choosing to study abroad chose to 
study in the U.S. 
 
--------------- 
The Bottom Line 
--------------- 
 
¶27. (C) South Korea is a like-minded, energetic partner that 
is ready, prepared, and wants to have a broader and deeper 
alliance with the United States.  Koreans would like the 
alliance to be a lot more than a security arrangement.  Yes, 
they want more say, even a more equal relationship, but this 
is only part of their motivation.  Rather, they see that 
their ties with the U.S. are deeper now than ever; witness, 
for example, the two million-strong Korean American 
community, and the enormous numbers of Koreans studying in 
the United States.  Above all, however, a very large majority 
of South Koreans are convinced that the ROK and the United 
States have shared values and shared strategic interests. 
It's time to take the relationship to a new level of global 
partnership, even as we deepen our cooperation on the Korean 
peninsula. 
 
------------- 
Your Meetings 
------------- 
 
¶28. (C) You are scheduled to meet with President Lee 
Myung-bak, National security Advisor Kim Sung-hwan, Foreign 
Minister Yu Myung-hwan, Trade Minister Kim Jong-hoon, Speaker 
of the National Assembly Kim Hyong-o, and Chairman of the 
National Assembly Foreign Affairs, Trade and Unification 
Committee Park Jin.  Likely topics of discussion include: 
 
-- North Korea: Your interlocutors may seek assurances that 
the U.S. will consult closely with the ROK on its North Korea 
policy and that the U.S. will not recognize North Korea as a 
nuclear state. 
 
-- U.S.-ROK Alliance: Your interlocutors may stress the 
importance of the U.S. commitment to the defense of the 
Korean peninsula. 
 
-- Global Partnership: Your interlocutors may gauge your 
level of interest in ROK contributions to reconstruction and 
stabilization of vital countries such as Afghanistan and 
Pakistan; ROK peacekeeping in Lebanon; and anti-piracy 
efforts off the coast of Somalia. 
 
-- FTA: Your interlocutors will seek your views on the 
prospects for Congressional approval of the agreement.  The 
Trade Minister will stress that the FTA represents a balance 
of American and Korean interests and that the ROKG cannot 
re-negotiate the text of the FTA. 
STEPHENS