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  기 밀 SEOUL 001670


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  국방부망 배포


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  수정본―1문단의 마지막 문장 고침²⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 05/10/2017


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  태그: PGOV³⁾, PREL⁴⁾, KS⁵⁾, KN⁶⁾


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  제 목: 이명박 외교 정책 보좌진, 한미 관계와 북한 언급


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  참조: SEOUL 1418


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  분류자: 정치 참사관 조셉 윤⁷⁾. 근거 1.4 (b/d)


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/09/24 00:53

1. 
   
   北신문, 이명박 판문점.통일전망대 발언 맹비난 연합뉴스

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001670
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - PARA 1 LAST SENTENCE FIXED
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2017
TAGS: PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], KS [Korea (South)], KN [Korea (North)]
SUBJECT: LEE MYUNG-BAK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISORS ON U.S.-ROK
RELATIONS AND NORTH KOREA
 
REF: SEOUL 1418
 
Classified By: POL Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
 
SUMMARY
-------
 
¶1. (C) Members of presidential contender Lee Myung-bak's
foreign policy team told poloffs on May 30 that Lee would
likely advocate a "pragmatic" approach to the U.S.-ROK
alliance, aimed principally to preserve room to
strengthen the relationship after the election without
alienating progressives by mentioning the word "alliance"
before the election. According to these academics, who are
three of a number of Lee's foreign policy advisors, Lee
would avoid making North Korea or foreign policy issues
key election issues. However, as the clear front-runner
in the presidential race, Lee must provide at least a minimum
vision on how he would deal with North Korea. For now, Lee,
more interested in not losing votes than anything else, is
painting a somewhat pedestrian, middle-of-the-road picture,
emphasizing investment, trade and aid to raise the DPRK living
standard in order to bring about reunification in some
distant future. END SUMMARY.
 
¶2. (C) Poloffs on May 30 met with Kim Woo-sang, Director
of Yonsei University's Institute of East & West Studies,
Cha Du-hyeong, Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
Research Fellow, and Cho Yun-young, Chung Ang University
Professor of International Relations. Kim, Cho and Cha are
three of a number of foreign policy advisors who are
working to prepare Lee for the upcoming presidential
campaign.
 
¶3. (C) In general, they said, Lee Myung-bak will attempt
to focus on domestic and economic issues, which he perceives
as his strengths. He will wait until challenged before
addressing foreign policy concerns. That opportunity will
likely come on June 19 in Daejeon, when the GNP primary
candidates will engage in a televised debate on
international affairs and security policy.
 
RELATIONS WITH U.S.
-------------------
 
¶4. (C) Kim said that Lee sees a stronger alliance
relationship with the U.S. as vital for the ROK's security
in the region. He assured us a Lee administration would
handle U.S.-ROK relations much better than President Roh or
former President Kim Dae-jung, and the ROK "would be an
entirely different country." However, for public
consumption, Lee would likely refer to the need for
"pragmatic relations" with the U.S., staying away from
referring to the "alliance." This would allow Lee to
tighten the relationship after the election, without
alienating those who chafe at too much American influence.
 
¶5. (C) In a revealing aside, Kim recounted that during a
recent ROK-Japan academic seminar, a retired Japanese
Ambassador had bluntly said that the ROK had to maintain
its alliance with the U.S. or else Japan may no longer be
able to treat the ROK as a friend, and the ROK would
therefore have to seek protection from China. Kim said
that he had replied that Japan's position in the event of
severed ties with the U.S. would be even worse, because
Japan would have to yield to China, whereas the ROK could
at least choose between favoring Japan or China.
 
NORTH KOREA AS A CAMPAIGN ISSUE
-------------------------------
 
¶6. (C) Kim said that he expected candidate Lee -- assuming
he receives the GNP nomination, which the advisors clearly
were counting on -- to try to keep North Korea from
becoming a major campaign issue. People cared much more
about the economy and domestic issues, and the public
generally wanted engagement policy to continue. That said,
Lee would change the tone of engagement policy to emphasize
the reciprocity that President Kim Dae-jung's "Sunshine
Policy" had initially envisioned. Lee's take on engagement
would entail greater penetration of western values into the
DPRK, which, Kim admitted, might be difficult for the DPRK
to accept. President Roh Moo-hyun's version of
 
engagement policy was "simple appeasement," Kim scoffed.
If Lee had been president last October when North Korea
tested nuclear weapons, he would have pushed for full
enforcement of UNSCR 1718 and full ROK participation in the
Proliferation Security Initiative.
 
¶7. (C) Lee has enquired of his advisors whether he should
discuss North Korean human rights during the campaign.
According to Cha, Lee will likely discuss not "human
rights," which is a volatile term, but rather North Koreans'
"right to happiness." This phraseology would avoid a
backlash from the DPRK, while putting the issue on the
table in broad terms. They all noted that no one could
attack the "right to happiness" as either too strong
or too weak.
 
¶8. (C) Kim referred to recent DPRK criticism of Lee over
statements Lee made during a visit to Panmunjum as
counterproductive to DPRK aims because it increased Lee's
credibility among GNP conservatives. Lee said,
"continued concessions to North Korea led to the death
of innocent civilians," and, "It is ironic that North
Korea is developing nuclear weapons to make itself a
powerful nation when its people are the poorest." Kim
said that it was likely that the criticism would
diminish later in the campaign as the DPRK accepts
that they would have to build a relationship with
Lee as the likely next president of the ROK. At the
same time, the prospect of a North-South summit meeting,
which the advisors saw as plausible in mid-August,
clearly struck a nerve. A summit would hurt Lee's
standing because the media would focus obsessively on
it for as much as one month beforehand and afterward, Kim
said. In addition, Cha said, ten million South Koreans,
many of them senior citizens with relatives in the North,
could have an emotional response to a summit. Although
this group is generally conservative, they might vote in
favor of a progressive candidate if they perceived
heightened prospects for more family reunifications.
 
NORTH KOREA DEVELOPMENT PLAN
----------------------------
 
¶9. (C) Kim said that Lee Myung-bak and his advisors were
fleshing out the North Korea "3,000 Unification Plan" that
would be similar to the U.S. Marshall Plan. The goal would
be to raise North Korea's per capita income to USD 3,000 per
year (Note: The OECD estimated the DPRK's per capita GDP as
USD 797 in 2004) within ten years (reftel). The economic
assumptions are heroic: USD 40 billion invested, initially
in infrastructure and then in a "giant" version of the
Kaesong Industrial Complex in multiple locations, aimed
at achieving DPRK per capita income growth of 17 percent
per year for 10 years. During this same period, the ROK's
per capita income would be expected to increase from its
present level (about USD 18,000/yr) to about USD 40,000
per year. Together, these changes would make unification
affordable, but the Lee plan focuses on DPRK economic
development rather than setting out a timeline for
unification.
 
¶10. (C) Politically, the "3,000 Unification Plan" could
only go forward if (a) North Korea were continuing to make
progress on denuclearization; (b) North Korea agreed to
the increased level of economic engagement; and (c) Japan
contributed to the economic development package. On (a),
Kim said that he hoped that the U.S. would agree that this
economic development plan could begin as long as there was
continued progress on denuclearization, rather than
insisting on its completion, which "will take years,"
beforehand. On (b), Kim said that he was aware that North
Korea could very likely regard an offer to invest USD 40
billion in its economy as a threat, but that the hope was
that improved DPRK-U.S. relations in connection with
denuclearization, along with security guarantees, would
ease DPRK concerns. On (c) the three agreed that Japan
would likely contribute 10 billion USD to the effort if the
abductee issue was resolved.
 
¶11. (C) What if the DPRK did not make progress on
denuclearization? Then the plan would be to work with the
U.S. and the international community to enforce UNSCR 1718
and PSI. Kim said that close cooperation with all
concerned nations would be vital.
 
-------
COMMENT
-------
 
¶12. (C) North Korea policy is not Lee Myung-bak's strong
suit and he is struggling to come up with new ideas. As
the clear front-runner in the presidential sweepstakes,
candidate Lee recognizes that has to put some flesh
behind his image as a "pragmatic conservative," but
at the same time, he knows he has more to lose than
gain in being adventurous. Lee's strategy, therefore,
is one of muddling through, entertaining various
ideas on North Korea, without firm commitments.
This appears to be his plan on choosing foreign
policy advisors too. Professor Kim has been close
to Lee for several years, but as the campaign heats up,
he faces stiff competition for Lee's ear from a cadre of
Korea University professors and alumni, among them,
notably, former FM Han Seung-soo and political science
professor Hyun In-taek. Lee's camp is reportedly run like
a company where different teams compete to have their ideas
endorsed by their "CEO." Therefore, while Kim, Cha and Cho
are currently key members of Lee's policy-making team, it
remains to be seen how they will fare in Lee's
ultra-competitive camp.
VERSHBOW