• 
  
  기 밀 SEOUL 001852


• 
  
  국방부망 배포¹⁾


• 
  
  국방부망 배포


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 06/19/2017


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  태그: KS²⁾, MARR³⁾, MNUC⁴⁾, PARM⁵⁾, PREL⁶⁾, KN⁷⁾


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  제 목: 제13차 한미 안보정책구상회의


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  분류자: 정치 참사관 대리대사 브라이언 맥피터스⁸⁾ 근거 1.4 (b,d).


• 
  
  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/08/03 22:13

1. 
   
   미군기지이전 PM 제안서 접수 및 발표 김태복과 행복나누기


2. 
   
   DNSA Demo


3. 
   
   Digital National Security Archive ProQuest

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001852
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2017
TAGS: KS [Korea (South)], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], PREL [External Political Relations], KN [Korea (North)]
SUBJECT: SPI 13: U.S.-ROK SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVE TALKS
 
Classified By: A/POL Brian D. McFeeters. Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
 
¶1. (C) Summary. The thirteenth U.S.-ROK Security Policy
Initiative talks (SPI 13) took place June 8, 2007 in Seoul.
Topics addressed included the transition of wartime
operational command (OPCON), UNC Armistice maintenance
responsibilities, airspace management, security cooperation
in Afghanistan, USFK camp returns, USFK realignment, U.S.
Army transformation in Korea, and regional security. The
U.S. delegation was headed by Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense Richard P. Lawless. Deputy Defense Minister Jeon
Jei-guk headed the ROK delegation. SPI 13 took place less
than one week after Defense Secretary Gates and ROK Defense
Minister Kim met with other leaders at the three-day
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, at which Gates reaffirmed
U.S. support for its allies in Asia and stated the importance
of East Asia increasingly involving itself in the development
and stability of Central Asia. Both of these issues featured
prominently in the SPI discussions. SPI 14 is scheduled for
late July in Hawaii. End Summary.
 
------------------------
WARTIME OPCON TRANSITION
------------------------
 
¶2. (C) Deputy Minister Jeon Jei-guk opened the discussion on
OPCON transition by stating that to his understanding,
"drafting of the plan for OPCON is moving forward as planned,
under the leadership of General Kim and General Bell."
Colonel Park Chan Joo then provided a detailed report of the
OPCON Transition Plan, highlighting different aspects of the
Implementation Plan, the concept for the Strategic
Transition, the Transition Exercise Program, and the
Implementation System. Jeon noted that the specific contents
of the Transition Plan were coordinated at the working level
and were "free from significant disagreements between the
Koreans and Americans."
 
¶3. (C) Lawless stated that the Transition Plan is a critical
first step in implementing OPCON transfer and worthy of
discussion at the next Security Consultative Meeting (SCM),
noting that the United States was impressed with the plan.
Noting that this was one of the subjects that Secretary Gates
was specifically briefed on, Lawless sought confirmation from
Jeon that the Koreans were on schedule to sign the agreement
no later than July 1, 2007. Highlighting that OPCON
transition would call for separate war fighting headquarters
for the U.S. and Korea, Lawless asked about ROK plans for the
location and funding of its headquarters.
 
¶4. (C) Jeon offered his assurances that the plan would be
signed in June and implementation would begin July 1.
Addressing Lawless' second question, Admiral Joong Ryun
stated that the U.S. and Korea were currently discussing this
issue, noting that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) was
working to include funding for the warfighting headquarters
in next year's budget. Jeon reassured Lawless that the
establishment of a war fighting headquarters was a top
priority for MND, and that he "expected no problem in
securing the funding." Jeon said that a decision on the
location of the headquarters would require further
consultation with the United States.
 
------------------------------------------
UNC Armistice Maintenance Responsibilities
------------------------------------------
 
¶5. (C) PolOff David Wolff presented the list of the
bilaterally developed principles governing the discussion of
Armistice Maintenance Responsibilities as tasked at SPI 12.
Wolff reported that USG and ROKG officials met at the
Colonel-level on May 15 and May 18 to craft an appropriate
list of principles, consultations that "were constructive and
done in the spirit of cooperation." On June 4,
representatives from the General Officers level met to
discuss the same issue, and agreed to the Guiding Principles
document. Once both sides formally agreed to the document
produced, Wolff explained, it would be used to guide the
discussion of the Senior Working Group charged with resolving
the authority-responsibility mismatch problem.
BEGIN TEXT
 
Guiding Principles:
 
The wartime operational control (OPCON) transition and
concurrent inactivation of the Combined Forces Command (CFC)
that will occur on April 17, 2012 will change the
relationship between the United Nations Command (UNC) and
Republic of Korea (ROK) forces. From that date, the ROK
Joint Chiefs of Staff will assume sole command and control
of ROK forces in Armistice, crisis and war. The United
States and the Republic of Korea have therefore engaged in
appropriate discussions on how Armistice maintenance
responsibilities will be carried out following OPCON
transition. Both parties have agreed that the following
Guiding Principles shall serve as the basis for that
comprehensive discussion:
 
- The United Nations Command will continue to support the
Armistice and to facilitate an international response to
armed aggression against the ROK.
- Korean Armistice Agreement will be maintained until the
day it is superseded by an appropriate agreement for a
peaceful settlement.
- Armistice maintenance will continue to be a responsibility
shared by the UNC and the ROK military.
- Strong deterrence by ROK and U.S. forces will remain a key
supporting component to maintaining the Armistice.
- As the ROK Forces/UNC relationship changes as a result of
OPCON transition and inactivation of CFC, the disparity
between respective Armistice responsibilities and authorities
over forces must be resolved.
- The U.S. and ROK are committed to resolving the disparity
between Armistice maintenance authorities and
responsibilities NLT April 17, 2012.
 
END TEXT
 
¶6. (C) Lawless emphasized that the United States appreciates
ROK recognition of the authority-responsibility mismatch
problem. However, he noted that it is important to remember
that, despite having reached agreement to transition OPCON on
April 17, 2012, the Armistice issue is a "separate problem
that we currently face everyday and not merely a minor
procedural problem." Lawless noted that the U.S. concern is
that a crisis situation could occur that involves ROK forces
and the UNC Commander. In a fast moving crisis with
international implications, regaining stability would be
difficult if not impossible for the UNC Commander, given the
present situation. Of particular concern is a crisis that
evolves into a military engagement in which the UNC Commander
is responsible for armistice maintenance, but has no control
over forces. According to Lawless, although we have given
ourselves five years to reach a solution on this issue, "the
sooner we are able to do so, the better off we will be."
Lawless proposed that a roadmap be developed on this issue
that could be discussed at the upcoming SCM in October, and
that the Senior Working Group's work be noted in the minutes
of SPI 13 to acknowledge where we are in the process.
 
¶7. (C) Jeon noted his satisfaction with all six declarations
in the Guiding Principles document and concurred with
Lawless' suggestions about developing a roadmap for
discussion at the SCM, as well as keeping minutes for each
update provided by the Senior Working Group to SPI. MND
Director General for the International Defense Policy Bureau
Kim Kyou-hyun also noted his satisfaction with approving the
Guiding Principles at SPI and the ROK side's willingness to
responsibly resolve the Armistice issue at an early date.
 
--------------------
AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT
--------------------
 
¶8. (C) Jeon provided an update on the Jik-do range issue,
noting that construction had resumed in March and was
scheduled for completion by mid-June, and that the range
would be ready for operation by the end of August. According
to Jeon, the U.S. and ROK would soon conclude a Memorandum of
Understanding governing the allocation of usage time and
maintenance costs. The ROK Air Force gave a briefing
regarding the broader airspace management situation on the
peninsula, and Jeon noted that a Working Group had been
established and met four times to date. He added that
efforts would be made to build an efficient airspace
operation system that reflected the training environment and
needs of the U.S. and the ROK. In order to do so, Jeon
stressed that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) would need to provide
information about the centralized control concept, planning,
and training requirements. Jeon stated that high-level
consultations between MND, ROK JCS, and USFK would need to
occur. Jeon then noted that while the ROKG believed it was
important to address the needs of USFK, "this process will
take some time, so I ask for your patience."
 
¶9. (C) Lawless noted that if the United States did not
believe this issue was important, we would not have raised
it at the Blue House, identifying it as a serious problem
that had not been resolved after three years of discussion.
Lawless stated that the briefing, the letter, and the
meetings notwithstanding, the ROKG tone seemed to suggest
that this was a problem only for the United States, rather
than a problem for the ROK or the Alliance, signifying a
large "gap between our two sides' acknowledgment of how
serious an issue this is." Lawless continued that if this
problem was not resolved, it would have negative implications
for the capabilities of the Alliance.
 
¶10. (C) Speaking about Jik-do range specifically, Lawless
stated that it was his belief that the ROKG did not pursue
this program with the necessary intensity or seriousness,
which created the current problem. He noted that there was
significant doubt on the U.S. side that Jik-do could be
operational in the time-frame established by the ROKG, adding
that even when the Jik-do range was completed, this would not
solve the USAF's training problems, which extended far beyond
Jik-do. He alo noted that only 30 percent of the available
training time would be allocated to U.S. units.
 
¶11. (C) The U.S. position, stated Lawless, "is that we need a
comprehensive long term plan for airspace/training range
management. The piecemeal approach taken by the ROK to
resolve this issue, with a hands-off policy by the MND,
simply is not working." According to Lawless, this
comprehensive approach should include updating the Pilsung
and Jik-do memoranda of understanding to reflect that "range
management," which was the responsibility of the ROKG,
included proper funding for range operations. Lawless
suggested that addressing this issue should occur at the MND
at Jeon's level, and not be left to the Korean Air Force.
Lawless also noted that because this issue had been elevated,
it should be resolved before October's SCM and that the
failure to do so would have serious consequences that could
involve shifting USAF resources (units) away from the Korean
peninsula, perhaps permanently.
 
¶12. (C) Lawless also raised the Electronic Warfare Training
issue, explaining that the United States "needs this
capability." Lawless noted that for many years, the United
States was responsible for owning, maintaining, and
operating electronic warfare (EW) equipment -- to the benefit
of both air forces. During that period of cooperation, the
United States bore almost the entire cost, even though in
later years the ROK disproportionately used that equipment.
Consequently, Lawless said, he was disappointed to learn that
as the ROK takes over that mission and installs its own
equipment, it has requested that the United States continue
to pay for usage. He asked Jeon to clarify why this decision
was made and to explain whether or not is was a final
decision on the part of MND and the ROK Air Force.
 
¶13. (C) Major General Duane Thiessen noted his agreement that
the issue of air space management in the ROK required a
comprehensive solution and stated that he could "not see any
way forward that did not include central management of the
ranges." Because the requirements of the U.S. squadrons were
not being met, it would be necessary to address this issue on
a different plane than the attempts that have repeatedly
failed in the past. "This is a management issue -- we know
how to train pilots, so do you -- but we need to manage
airspace the way we do everywhere else in the world,"
Thiessen said.
 
¶14. (C) Jeon responded that USAF training requirements were
very important to the ROKG and that the assessment that
Koreans do not take this issue seriously was "off the
target." Jeon noted his belief that there had been some
miscommunication and that MND was committed to determining
how to resolve the issue of limited air space in the most
efficient manner. He asked that the United States share more
information about its training needs, provided this
information was not classified. Responding to Lawless'
comments that the issue be elevated to his level at MND, Jeon
stated that in principle, "airspace is a matter that must be
dealt with in technical terms, so the authority has been
delegated to the Korean Air Force. However, since the last
SPI, the ROK JCS had taken up responsibility on this and MND
would soon join JCS in reviewing the matter." On the issue
of maintenance costs for the Pilsung range, Jeon stated that
"at the time when the construction of the Pilsung range
began, the understanding principle was that the equipment
would be provided and operated by the U.S. and Korea would
provide the land. Since then, Korea and the U.S. have
divided costs and usage time in half. On August 3, 2005,
Pilsung management was transferred to Korea, and they
received a U.S. request to bear the entire cost for Pilsung."
Jeon noted that even when the United States managed Pilsung,
the ROK bore half the cost, meaning that, "responsibility for
the management of the range does not equate to responsibility
to bear its entire maintenance cost," while noting that a
solution still needed to be determined. On the issue of EW
equipment, Jeon stated that in the 2004 Agreement, the United
States promised it would continue to operate EW equipment
until the Korean Air Force had this equipment ready. The
ROKG therefore did not understand why the USAF withdrew all
its EW equipment in September 2006, Jeon said.
 
¶15. (C) Lawless responded that "a number of these issues
have cooked over time and are now boiling." He reiterated
that the USG views EW Training differently from the ROKG, in
that the United States made a good faith effort to provide
the services, never expecting the ROK Air Force would wait
until 2011 to install its own equipment. Lawless stressed
the need to address these issues in a comprehensive way,
suggesting that the only way to resolve the issue was to
elevate it to the Deputy Minister level. Jeon nodded his
head in agreement.
 
-------------------------------
Security Cooperation: NATO/ISAF
-------------------------------
 
¶16. (C) Lawless stated that at the last SPI meeting, the USG
and ROKG discussed the process and requirements for the ROK
becoming a full non-NATO member of the International Security
Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and that the ROKG had
reiterated its commitment to this process. Lawless further
noted that he had already made clear in discussions the
previous day at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
(MOFAT) that the United States would support any ROK troop
extension in Afghanistan, as well as the establishment of a
ROK Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) there. Lawless
emphasized that working with NATO was a worthwhile, if
time-consuming, endeavor, and that NATO's decision to offer a
partner-level partnership to the ROK was an important one
reflecting the Korea's development.
 
¶17. (C) In addition, Lawless extended the full support of the
U.S. Mission to NATO in Brussels, the OSD NATO group, and the
State Department to work with the ROK in its interactions
with NATO's bureaucracy. Lawless pointed out that "the
Korean presence in Afghanistan had been very important both
for the real work being done there and for the optic of Korea
being engaged -- on the ground -- in Central Asia. For this
reason, the U.S. believes it would send the wrong signal for
the ROK to completely disengage from Afghanistan, which is
happening now, upon instructions from the National Assembly."
Lawless repeated an offer made the previous day to Deputy
Foreign Minster Shim, that the United States would bring a
briefing team to assist Korea in working with NATO. If Korea
were to leave Afghanistan, Lawless said, "you would be the
first country to do so. And we think that would send a
negative message globally, and would send the signal that
Korea is inclined not to be engaged in Afghanistan or in
Central Asia."
 
¶18. (C) Jeon noted that the Koreans fully understood the U.S.
position regarding Korea's future endeavors in Afghanistan,
and that they "appreciate the effort the U.S. is dedicating
to the cause in Afghanistan." According to Jeon, the ROKG
had received the necessary agreements to make the transition
under NATO ISAF and hoped to go through that process as soon
as possible. Regarding the Korean units deployed in
Afghanistan, Jeon said that "the National Assembly has set
the deadline, and by the end of December, these units will be
removed." He noted, however, that the ROKG was currently
reviewing other means of contributing to the international
effort in Afghanistan after ROK troop withdrawal, including a
PRT.
 
------------
Camp Returns
------------
 
¶19. (C) Jeon said he was satisfied with the completion of
SOFA procedures for the return of nine camps on May 31, and
noted that future camp returns should not rise to SPI-level
discussions, but be handled solely through the SOFA process.
Jeon explained that MOFAT, MND, and Ministry of Environment
(MOE) officials were currently preparing for a June 25-26
National Assembly (NA) hearing on the camp returns process
that has been called by the Environmental and Labor
Committee. The focus of the hearing will be on environmental
remediation of the returned camps and how U.S.-ROK
negotiations were handled on the issue. Jeon offered his
assurances that MND and other ROK ministries did not wish to
see the camp return issue publicized and would work to
convince the NA that the best decisions possible were made in
handling the issue.
 
¶20. (C) Jeon requested that USFK provide any required
information to help ROK officials prepare for the hearing, as
General Pace suggested USFK would be able to do on the
sidelines of the Singapore meetings. MOFAT Special
Coordinator Hwang explained that the ROKG concern was that
under special legislation, the NA has the authority to summon
government officials to the NA hearing and require any
document requested be provided. While recognizing that the
domestic legislation conflicted with SOFA arrangements, Hwang
explained that if a ministry official refused to provide
requested documents, he/she could face criminal prosecution.
 
¶21. (C) Lawless stressed that the United States had nothing
to hide, but that the concern was with how the information
would be distributed and used. Jeon explained that the ROKG
was not requesting the release of all U.S. documents related
to the camp return process, but only that USFK provide any
specific information that ROK officials find they need to
prepare for the NA hearing. Jeon concurred with Lawless'
request that the ROK side obtain U.S. agreement on how any
shared information would be used.
 
¶22. (C) Jeon said that the two-year delay in processing camp
returns under the SOFA provisions was due to different legal
interpretations of the SOFA Joint Committee minutes by the
ROK and the U.S. sides. Specifically, the ROKG focused on
the point that the ROK domestic environment be protected,
Jeon explained. Jeon suggested that time be taken to clarify
the SOFA provisions regarding camp returns to avoid such
time-consuming delays in the future. Lawless stressed that
the United States did not wish to revise the provisions, but
agreed that further discussions to clarify the procedures
already in place to make the process more efficient would be
helpful, noting that they should begin after the June 25-26
NA hearing.
 
¶23. (C) Lawless noted that the United States was in receipt
of two letters from MOFAT requesting a U.S. decision within a
week to release SOFA documents related to camp returns,
including the nine facilities returned on May 31. Lawless
noted that, in accordance with the SOFA, the public release
of documents required the agreement of both sides, and
therefore, that the understanding was that without U.S.
agreement, the documents would not be released to the public
or NA. Lawless explained that the release of these
documents, particularly the very negative MOE documentation
received by the United States on May 31, would present a very
unbalanced and negative picture of U.S. stewardship of lands
in the ROK. Lawless noted that if the documents came out,
the United States would have no choice but to aggressively
respond, but was concerned that the resulting media
"nightmare" could harm the Alliance. Lawless also said that
the United States would expect a comprehensive, joint
USG-ROKG response to mischaracterizations in the press and
public if the documents were released or leaked, and
requested that the ROKG remain in contact with the U.S.
Embassy and USFK to prepare a unified response as the
situation develops.
 
¶24. (C) Jeon said that the ROKG was aware of U.S. concerns,
and acknowledged that the ROKG could not disclose SOFA
documents without U.S. consent. Jeon noted that the NA
Environmental Committee wanted all the documents related to
camp returns to be disclosed, but that the ROKG did not
support this. However, the ROKG believed that the release of
the 2003 Tab A documents would not cause significant
difficulties for either side, Jeon said. Jeon explained that
the ROKG planned to justify the two-year delay in
negotiations by showing that the SOFA environmental
provisions did not provide sufficient guidance. Jeon
reiterated the ROKG request for U.S. cooperation in sharing
necessary information as they prepare for the NA hearing on
June 25-26.
 
----------------
USFK Realignment
----------------
 
¶25. (C) While concrete details have not been determined, Jeon
said that a public groundbreaking ceremony to demonstrate
ROKG support for the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) and Land
Partnership Plan (LPP) projects were planned for the
September-October timeframe at Parcel K. The ROK side then
provided an update on the Camp Humphries construction
project. The final ROK family remaining on the site was
expected to vacate the land by the end of June. Parcel 2 was
expected to be granted after demolition and waste projects
are completed in July. Parcel 1 was currently being
landfilled and Parcel K design work is underway, with
construction expected to begin in late June. Access roads
for construction were currently under design, with completion
slated for June 2008. Expansion of local roads could be
completed by December 2008.
 
¶26. (C) Jeon reported that the Final Master Plan (MP) was
currently under review by MOFAT. In mid-June, the Final MP
would be submitted to the SOFA Joint Committee for approval.
Following the signing of the Program Management Consortium
(PMC) contract with the U.S.-ROK CH2M Hill-Kunwon consortium
on June 7, Jeon said that the ROKG anticipated that the PMC
verification of the Final MP would take about three months.
Jeon said that the ROKG did not have an obligation, and did
not intend to report, the SOFA-approved Final MP to the NA.
However, when the ROKG briefed the NA on the MP in February,
they had told the NA that the exact budget and project period
would be available only after PMC verification, Jeon
explained. Therefore, after PMC verification is completed in
September, Jeon said that the ROKG plans to report only the
budget and project period aspects of the Final MP to the NA,
as well as to the public. Jeon offered his assurances that
the ROKG would coordinate with the U.S. side to determine the
scope of reporting to the NA and the public in order to keep
the issue out of the limelight. Jeon said that no public
hearing on the Final MP was expected.
 
--------------------------
Special Measures Agreement
--------------------------
 
¶27. (C) Lawless noted that the United States was considering
the ROKG proposal on a "new" Special Measures Agreement (SMA)
process after a meeting earlier in the week (reported
septel). Lawless emphasized, however, that the United States
continued to adhere to the previous understanding that once
SMA funds were provided to USFK, they became part of the USFK
pool of funds and could be used for relocation-related
expenses. Lawless noted that SMA was likely to remain an
issue in future SPI meetings due to the impact SMA funding
issues had on the implementation of U.S.-ROK agreements
already in place. In response, Jeon noted that bilateral
discussions to improve the burden sharing mechanism were
underway and expressed hope that they would yield
satisfactory results.
 
-------------------------------
US Army Transformation in Korea
-------------------------------
 
¶28. (C) Lawless explained that Eighth Army transformation
plans in Korea were consistent with overall U.S. Army
transformation plans worldwide. Colonel Parker briefed
current plans, noting that the transformation would create a
warfighting headquarters and thereby bring greater
capabilities to the peninsula Operational Command Post (OCP)
in Korea. The pacific region's Main Command Post (MCP), able
to provide additional support, would be located in Hawaii.
The OCP in Korea and all its Army forces would remain under
the operational control of the USFK Commander.
 
¶29. (C) Jeon said that it was apparent that USFK would be
stronger and more maneuverable after the transformation, and
thanked the U.S. side for the updated information. Jeon
asked that the United States continue to remember that the
capabilities of USFK had a direct impact on the security of
the Korean peninsula. Offering ROK assistance as needed,
Jeon requested further updates as plans progress, so as to
mitigate any security vacuum that may result from the
transformation process.
 
--------------------------
2007 China Military Report
--------------------------
 
¶30. (C) Lawless provided the ROK delegation with copies of
the DOD 2007 "Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of
the People's Republic of China" and explained that DOD
briefers would be available to answer ROK questions at SPI 14
in August. Lawless noted that a number of countries in the
region paid close attention to the annual report and had
requested U.S. briefings. Lawless briefly highlighted
significant developments from last year's report and issues
with direct relevance to the ROK, including China's expansion
and deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles
capable of striking regionally.
 
¶31. (C) Jeon noted that Defense Minister Kim emphasized the
need for both Japan and China to maintain transparency in
their military development during his recent visits in the
region. Jeon stressed that the ROK deemed transparency
essential to maintaining peace and stability in the region
and that the ROK continued to press China to pursue its
military development in a transparent manner so it could
contribute to, rather than threaten, the international
community. Jeon said he looked forward to discussing the
2007 China Military Report further at the next SPI.
 
----------------
SCM FOIA Request
----------------
 
¶32. (C) Lawless explained that the National Security
Archives, an organization associated with the George
Washington University had submitted a Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) request for all documents related to the previous
38 U.S.-ROK SCM meetings. Lawless explained that by law, the
USG was required to either release the documents or justify
the decision not to release the information. Lawless noted
that some of the materials were prepared by the ROK side and
were unclassified by the United States, but may still be
sensitive for the ROK side. Lawless assured the ROKG that
any information it deemed sensitive would be protected. In
order to determine which documents are sensitive, Lawless
requested that the ROKG identify a POC at ROK Embassy in
Washington DC authorized to make decisions on what was
classified and what could be released.
¶33. (C) Jeon agreed that some of the materials may be
classified or sensitive information in the ROK, and said that
the documents, especially those related to ROK national
defense strategy vis-a-vis the North Korean threat, had to be
reviewed very carefully. Jeon agreed that a ROK Embassy POC
be established, but said that the review of documents would
need to be handled by MND's U.S. Policy division and MOFAT.
Due to the volume of the documents, Jeon said he expected the
process would take a long time to complete, and recommended
that the status be reviewed at future SPI meetings as
needed.
 
------------
PARTICIPANTS
------------
 
¶34. (U) Participants List
 
United States
-------------
Mr. Richard P. Lawless, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense,
ISA/AP, OSD
MajGen Duane D. Thiessen, CJ5, USFK
MajGen Frank A. Panter, Incoming CJ5 USFK
Brig Gen Edwin A. Vincent, Mobilization Assistant to J5
USPACOM
Mr. Sung Kim, Director, Office of Korean Affairs,
DoS LTC Michael Finnegan, Senior Country Director for Korea,
ISA/AP, OSD
Ms. Mary Beth Morgan, Korea Country Director, ISA/AP OSD
Mr. Andrew Hyde, ROK Unit Chief, Office of Korean Affairs,
DoS
Mr. David Wolff, Pol-Mil Chief, AMEMB Seoul
COL Richard Parker, Chief Future Operations, EUSA
Col Chris P. DiNenna, Chief, Strategy and Policy Division,
J5-J, USFK
Col Robert Gardner, Deputy Chief C5 Policy, CFC
COL Kevin Madden, Chief Joint U.S. Military Affairs
Group-Korea
COL Kip McCormick, Defense Attache, AMEMB Seoul
Col Daniel J. Russell, Assistant Chief of Staff, Engineer,
USFK
Mr. David Rathgeber, Special Assistant to Judge Advocate,
USFK
Mr. Robert Mounts, Special Assistant to Deputy CDR for
SOFA,USFK
Lt Col (P) Bob Loynd, Chief Policy Coordination C5, CFC
LTC Steve Gransback, Deputy Chief Policy Branch, J5-J, USFK
LCDR Kevin Aanestad, Korea Desk Officer, NEA Div J5, JCS
Maj Rich McGlamory, Chief Int'l Relations, J5-J, USFK
Dr. Warren Switzer, Int'l Relations Officer, J5-J, USFK
1LT Kim Woo Joong, ROKAF Interpreter
 
Republic of Korea
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Dr. Jeon Jei Guk, Deputy Minister of Defense for Policy, MND
Dr. Kim, Kyou-hyun, Director General, International Defense
Policy Bureau, MND
Mr. Hwang Seung Hyun, Senior Coord., Security Cooperation,
MOFAT
RADM (U) Kim Joong Ryun, Director Strategy & Planning, JCS
BG Kim, Byoung Gui, Senior Researcher for Alliance MND
BG (P) Yang, Chol Hwan, Director Operation & Training
Division, AF
COL (P) Yoo Jae Ik, Chief, ROK-US Alliance Task Force, MND
COL Song Seung Jong, Director, U.S. Policy Division, MND
COL Park Sang Ryool, Director, USFK Base Relocation Team, MND
COL Park Chan Joo, Chief, CIWG, MND
COL Youn Je Uk, Defense Policy, Blue House
COL Chi Yoon Kyu, Director, WMD Policy Team
CDR Lee Bong Chun, Action Officer, International Policy
Division, MND
LTC Kim Kyong Ok, Action Officer, U.S. Policy Division, MND
LTC Kong Pyong Won, Deputy Director, U.S. Policy Team, MND
Mr. Kim Jung Sup, Director, International Policy Team
Divisions
Mr. Park Jong Dae, Director, SOFA Affairs Division, MOFAT
Mr. Lee Jeong Kyu, Director, NAD III, MOFAT
VERSHBOW