[WIKI 비밀문서] “김대중-노무현 정권, 북한의 유사시 상황 논의 금지.. 북한 자극하는 것 두려워 했다” 버시바우 국무부 보고
[WIKI 비밀문서] “김대중-노무현 정권, 북한의 유사시 상황 논의 금지.. 북한 자극하는 것 두려워 했다” 버시바우 국무부 보고
  • 위키리크스한국
  • 기사승인
  • 최종수정 2019.05.08 08:13
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고 노무현 대통령과 김정일 국방위원장. [청와대 사진기자단]

한반도에 지각변동이 진행되고 있는 가운데 주한미국대사관이 '김대중, 노무현 정권이 북한 정권이 갑자기 붕괴되는 상황에 대비한 논의를 금지하는 등 북한을 자극하는 것을 두려워 했다'는 보고서를 본국에 보냈던 것으로 밝혀졌다.

위키리크스가 입수한 2008년 9월 10일자 주한미대사관의 본국 국무부 기밀 보고전문에 따르면, 당시 알렉산더 버시바우 대사는 ‘김정일의 건강 이상설’과 관련, 한국 내에서 수집된 다양한 정보를 보고했다.

보고에서 버시바우 대사는 “모든 고위급 회동에서, 미국과 남한은 북한 문제에 관해 긴밀히 협의하자는데 항상 견해를 같이 한다”고 밝혔다. 그는 그러나 “그러나 말보다 실천이 더 어려운 상황인 것이, 과거 10년 동안 김대중, 노무현 대통령이 북한의 안정과 예측 가능성에 중점을 둔 광범위한 포용정책에 헌신했던 게 그 이유”라고 지적했다.

버시바우 대사는 “북한을 자극하길 두려워 했던 노무현과 김대중은 미국은 말할 것도 없이 한국정부 내부에서도 북한 유사시 논의를 본질적으로 금하였다”고 평가했다. 이 기밀 보고 전문의 비밀해제 시점은 2018년 9월이다.

당시 보고전문은 미국이 김대중, 노무현 정권 내내 불편한 속내를 갖고 있었으며, 이명박 정권 들어서도 미국 주도의 북한 정책을 펼쳐가는데 앞선 두 정권의 정책이 상당한 장애적 요소로 작용하고 있었고 있었다는 점을 시사하고 있다.

버시바우 대사는 이 전문을 끝으로 이임했으며, 이후 미국 국방부 국제안보담당 차관보에 임명됐다. 김정일은 2008년 당시부터 끊임없이 건강 이상설에 휘말리다 2011년 12월 사망했다.

[위키리크스한국=강지현 기자]

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001795

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/10/2018
TAGS: KS, KN, PGOV, PREL
SUBJECT: KIM JONG-IL ILL HEALTH RUMORS
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

 


SUMMARY

  1. (C) Rumors that Kim Jong-il (KJI) may be gravely ill or
    worse are circulating in Seoul, fueled by various leaked
    intel and his failure to appear at the September 9 Pyongyang
    parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the founding of
    the DPRK. The ROKG initial reaction is cautious, seeking
    factual information on his condition. President Lee
    Myung-bak held an emergency cabinet-level meeting about the
    issue on September 10. South Koreans are of the view that if
    KJI is indeed incapacitated or dead, the situation would be
    quite different from that of Kim Il-sung's death in 1994,
    when his successor, KJI, had been clearly designated and the
    military power balance was more favorable to the North than
    now. ROKG officials have also conveyed to us informally that
    that even if the rumors of KJI's ill-health turn out to be
    exaggerated on this occasion, Seoul and Washington should
    begin discussions on North Korean contingencies. END SUMMARY.

KJI OUT OF SIGHT


  1. (SBU) Koreans noted in early September that Kim Jong-il
    had not been seen publicly since August 14, when the DPRK's
    Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) reported that he had
    visited Korean People's Army Unit 1319, a report that could
    not be independently verified. The buzz increased after a
    September 6 media report cited an unnamed ROKG official to
    the effect that five Chinese doctors had recently visited
    Pyongyang during late August/early September to treat KJI.
    Subsequent articles speculated that he had suffered a stroke
    or heart attack, noting his reputed diabetes and heavy
    drinking.

    (SBU) On September 10, ROK media reported widely the fact


  2. that KJI did not appear at the September 9 parade
    commemorating the 60th anniversary of the founding of the
    DPRK. The articles noted that KJI had regularly appeared at
    the September 9 event, the DPRK's equivalent of July 4, and
    that 60th anniversaries were especially important in Korea.
    Subsequent media reports on September 10 cited North Korean
    officials, including head of state Kim Yong-nam, denying that
    there was anything wrong with KJI, but not explaining his
    absence. The tone of ROK media reports has been cautious,
    noting past episodes, such as mid-2006, when KJI was out of
    sight for months and subsequently reappeared. By the evening
    of September 10, TV and radio news broadcasts were dominated
    by speculation over KJI's whereabouts and welfare; media
    speculation also extended to possible successors, KJI's past
    illnesses, regime stability, and the future of inter-Korean
    relations.


  3.  

ROKG REACTION -- MUTED SO FAR


  1. (C) ROKG reaction has also been cautious, focusing on
    getting the facts. President Lee Myung-bak held an emergency
    meeting on the issue on September 10, which a contact
    described as focusing on the ROKG impression that KJI is
    chronically ill, even if his current condition is not known.
    Minister of Unification Kim Ha-joong told the National
    Assembly's Foreign Affairs and Unification Committee during
    previously scheduled September 10 hearings that, "Nothing has
    been confirmed but that (Kim) was absent from the September 9
    event." Meanwhile, MOFAT's Six-Party Talks Representative
    told a contact that he believed KJI was now recuperating from
    a stroke.


  2. (C) Contacts in MOFAT's Office of Inter-Korean affairs
    told us that they felt certain that KJI had suffered a stroke
    and that MOFAT officers had been recalled from leave to work
    the issue. In a previously scheduled meeting with POL M/C,
    MOFAT Director-General Chang Ho-Jin said that he was quite
    worried that there was no "real planning or discussion" on
    North Korea "contingency" issues. He said that he had been
    thinking about these issues for some time and that he had
    been asked recently to begin inormal consultations with his
    USG counterparts. Perhaps, PDAS Arvizu's visit later this
    month could kick off such discussions, DG Chang said.


  3. (C) Also in a previously scheduled meeting, GNP National
    Assemblyman Lee Sang-deuk, who is the elder brother of
    President Lee, told POL M/C that he believed Washington and
    Seoul should have a process in place to discuss North Korean
    issues. Rep. Lee assessed that the "political mood" within
    the ROKG had changed substantially since the Roh Moo-hyun
    days; he was quite certain the Blue House would welcome such
    discussions, which should focus on broad political
    strategies, such as how to assess the possible reactions of
    regional powers, especially China, Russia and Japan, and how
    to deal with a likely flood of refugees.


  4.  

UNCERTAINTY COMPARED TO 1994


  1. (C) If KJI is incapacitated or worse, Korean analysts have
    pointed out, the situation would be much more uncertain than
    in 1994, when KJI had clearly been groomed to succeed Kim
    Il-sung. ROK media in recent days have renewed speculation
    about which, if any, of KJI's sons might succeed him, but
    virtually all DPRK watchers here agree that all the sons are
    too weak to have any chance at the top slot. Another
    difference from 1994 is that the DPRK is much weaker now,
    after the mid-1990s famine and subsequent continuing decline
    in agricultural output and GDP. The corollary is that South
    Korea is substantially stronger, economically and militarily,
    than in 1994. In addition, the fact that the DPRK tested a
    nuclear weapon in October 2006 and may have several nuclear
    weapons on hand would bear on any succession crisis. Taken
    together, several analysts believe, these factors could mean
    that the ROKG, with the conservative Lee Administration in
    charge, would be interested in affecting outcomes in the DPRK
    if KJI leaves the scene, which is in contrast to 1994 when
    the ROK was interested in stability above all else.

  2.  

COMMENT: CONSULTATIONS NEEDED


  1. (C) In all high-level meetings, the U.S. and South Korea
    always agree to consult closely on North Korea issues. This
    was easier said than done, however, during the past ten
    years, mostly because Presidents Roh Moo-hyun and Kim
    Dae-jung were committed to a broad engagement policy centered
    on providing stability and predictability for North Korea.
    Fearing a provoked North Korea, Roh and Kim essentially
    forbade discussions of North Korean contingencies within the
    ROKG, let alone with us. Given DG Chang's overture -- and
    Rep Lee's views -- we assess that this topic is no longer
    taboo. Even if the current rumors about KJI's ill health
    turn out to be exaggerated, we believe this episode points to
    the need to begin regular consultations with the ROKG about
    contingencies in the North, and soon. VERSHBOW

♦ 주한미국대사관의 국무부 보고 전문/ 번역

http://wikileaks-kr.org/08seoul1795/

 

 

 

kbs1345@naver.com


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