정보공개의 자유에 관한 헌법 조항 하에 공개된 문서들을 통해 2012년 중반 당시 외교부 장관 케빈 러드가 미국 버지니아 주 동부지부의 비밀 대배심 배심원단이 선정됐다는 것을 알고 있었다는 것이 드러났다.

당시 러드는 “대배심이 봉인 상태의 기소장을 발부할 수 있으며, 이론상 봉인된 기소장 하나가 어산지에게 발부됐을 수 있다는 것을 알고 있다” 고 언급한 것으로 알려졌다.

1년 뒤 <시드니 모닝헤럴드>의 보도에 따르면, 미국이 어산지와 <위키리크스>에 대한 수사를 아직도 진행 중인지에 관한 호주 정부의 관심을 묻는 질문에 카는 호주에 영향을 주는 일이 아니므로 이에 대한 더 이상의 조사는 없을 것이라고 답한 것으로 전해진다. 그는 여기에 어떤 자원도 할애하지 않을 것이라고 덧붙였다고 한다.

스트랫포 이메일이 공개된 다음날 러들램은 상원이 어산지를 저널리스트로 인식하도록 운동을 펼쳤지만, 그의 노력과 2008년 이코노미스트 뉴미디어 어워드, 2009 국제 암네스티 영국 미디어 어워드, 르몽드 독자 선정 올해의 인물, 2010년 타임 올해의 인물 등 어산지의 언론인으로서의 무수한 국제적인 수상 이력에도 불구하고 현재까지 호주 정부는 이를 거부하고 있는 것으로 여겨지고 있다.

2011년 11월 2일 영국 고등법원 왕좌 재판소(Queen’s Bench Division of the British High Court)는 어산지를 저널리스트로, <위키리크스>를 언론 기관으로 인식한 것이 가장 중요한 사례로 평가되고 있다.

스트랫포 이메일 공개 몇 달 뒤, 어산지의 대법원 항소는 패소했고, 그는 바로 에콰도르 대사관으로 들어갔다. 어산지가 대사관에 들어간 2012년 6월 19일 바로 다음 날 에콰도르 정부는 어산지의 망명 요청을 승인하는 발표를 했다.

당시 영국이 에콰도르 대사관을 위협한 것으로 전해지고 있으며, 에콰도르는 이 위협을 ‘정치적 자살’이라고 비난했고, 주류 언론들은 전례 없는 영국의 무모한 행동이라고 보도했으며, <위키리크스>는 협박에 기대는 영국이라고 비난했다. 그러나 영국은 건물의 외교적 지위 철회에 관한 1987년 영국법을 부활시키면서 자신들의 행동을 변호하고, 에콰도르 대사관 주변의 감시를 강화했다.

이에 대해 전 에콰도르 외교부 장관 리카르도 파티노가 대사관을 공격하는 행위는 어떠한 것도 영사관계에 관한 비엔나 협약을 위반하는 것이라고 했다고 전해진다.

위기가 고조에 이를 때 러들램은 상원에서 외교부 장관인 밥 카에게 한밤중 영국에서 경찰 차량들이 에콰도르 대사관으로 들어가고, 도로를 차단하고, 문을 부수려는 위협을 가하고, 대사관 영역을 다시 규정하려는 위협을 가하는 것에 대해 외교부 장관이나 런던 고등판무관이 영국에 비엔나 협약을 위반하지 말라는 항의를 한 적이 있느냐고 물었다.

이에 카는 이것은 어산지와 에콰도르와 영국의 문제라며, 호주 정부는 영국의 사법 절차에 관여할 수 없다고 답했다고 한다.

당시 에콰도르 대사관에 가했던 영국의 위협은 단지 어산지에게만 위험한 것이 아니라, 심각한 국제법 위반이었던 것으로 전해진다.

2016년 2월 11일 호주의 외교방위통상입법위원회 청문회에서 당시 외교통상부 수석 차관보이자 영사위기관리과의 존 필립은 호주 정부가 2011년 12월 이후 스웨덴 당국과 접촉하지 않았음을 인정했다. 이로써 스웨덴이 수사를 5년 이상 오래 끌어가는 동안, 호주는 스웨덴의 수사와 관련해 외교적으로 아무런 것도 하지 않은 것으로 보여지는 것으로 분석된다.

어산지가 임의 구금 상태에 있다는 판결을 내린 임의 구금에 관한 유엔 인권위원회 실무단(UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention)의 2015년 보고에 맞서 당시 호주 외교통상부 차관 피터 바기스는 법적 구속력이 있는 판결이 아니라고 주장하면서, 호주 정부가 스웨덴이나 영국 당국에 판결과 관련하여 전혀 항의하고 나서지 않았다는 것을 시인했다고 한다.

2017년 3월 31일 러들램은 어산지가 임의 구금돼 있다는 유엔 임의 구금에 관한 실무단의 2016년 판결을 상원 위원회에 전했는데, 이번에도 존 필립과 전 상원의원이자 당시 법무부 장관인 조지 브래디스가 이 판결이 법적 구속력이 없다는 뜻을 고수했다고 한다.

2016년 2월 6일 외교부 장관 줄리 비숍이 어산지의 새 여권 발급 요청을 받았지만, 유엔 임의 구금에 관한 실무단의 판결이 공개되고 난 다음날 비숍은 유엔의 보고서를 읽었으며, 호주 시민 어산지를 위해 법률 자문을 구하고 있다는 성명을 발표했다. 그러나 정보공개법에 따라 밝혀진 바에 의하면, 4일 후 존 필립과 당시 호주 여권 사무국장이 외교부 장관에게 유엔 판결에 대해, 외국의 적법한 사법절차에 관여할 수 없기 때문에 유엔 판결이 났다고 어산지 사건을 해결하려고 하지는 말 것을 조언한 것으로 전해진다. 이들이 스웨덴과 영국의 사법 시스템을 전적으로 믿는다고 했다고도 전해진다.

2016년 어산지는 유엔의 판결이 국제 규범에서 상위에 있는 인식 체계인 ‘법적 신념(opinio juris, 국제법의 주체인 국가가 국제법을 따른다)’이라고 말하면서 법적 구속력이 있음을 주장했다. 그리고 유엔의 판결은 영국과 스웨덴이 동참하고 있는 유엔의 설립 기반을 이루는 것이라고도 주장했다.

또한 어산지는 ‘이들은 스스로가 개입한 법적 절차에서 나온 결과에 반박할 수 없다. 이는 이들이 초기에 유엔에서 수긍하고, 인식하고, 함께 설립한 사법권이다’라고 덧붙였고, ‘결국에는 당신들이 법을 어겼기 때문에, 결과가 마음에 안 들면, 언론을 통해 인정하지 않는다거나, 인신공격을 하는 것이다’라고 말했다.

2017년 7월 19일 비숍은 유엔의 판결이 법적 구속력이 없다는 것을 반복했고, 이 판결은 호주가 아닌 영국과 스웨덴을 대상으로 한 것이라고 지적했다. 비숍은 또한 어산지가 에콰도르 대사관에 머물면서 합법적인 체포를 피하고 있으며, 호주 정부는 외국의 법적 절차에 개입할 수 없다고 말했다. 그러나 호주 정부가 다른 사건에서는 다른 태도를 보인 것으로 전해진다.

2013년 호주인 저널리스트 피터 그레스트가 이집트 당국에 체포됐고, 테러 관련 죄로 7년형을 선고받았었다. 당시 줄리 비숍은 다른 나라의 형사 절차에 개입할 수 없지만, 그가 가석방돼야 한다는 호주 정부의 태도를 계속 밀고 나갈 것이며, 그의 석방을 위해 할 수 있는 일들을 모색하겠다고 말했다.

그레스트의 조기 석방 뒤, 2015년 <ABC>의 뉴스 방송에서 비숍은 호주 정부가 이집트 당국에 그레스트의 재심이 이뤄지면 안 된다고 항의했다고 말했다.

호주의 의원들 또한 여러 차례의 의회 청문회 등에서 언론의 사명과 보도기자들의 안전을 내세우며, <로이터>, <CNN>, <BBC> 등 주류 매체들을 위해 일한 유명한 저널리스트 그레스트의 석방을 강력하게 촉구했지만, 어산지에 대한 언급은 전혀 없었다고 한다.

그레스트가 이집트에서 형을 선고받은 뒤, 당시 호주의 법무장관 조지 브래디스 또한 그레스트의 석방을 위해 이집트 대통령이 나서 줄 것을 정식 요청할 것이라고 말한 것으로 전해진다.
이 사례로 호주 정부가 어산지는 언론인으로 인정하고 있지 않다는 해석이 나왔다.

2018년 10월 25일 호주 외교통상부가 어산지에게 새 여권을 발급한 사실이 전해졌다. 그러나 이와 동시에 외교통상부의 수석차관보 앤드류 토드는 어산지가 스스로 영국 당국으로 가야한다고 주장했다고 한다.

같은 맥락으로 지난 주 상원 청문회에서 토드와 마리스 앤 페인 등은 어산지가 임의 구금 상태가 아니며, 원하면 언제든 에콰도르 대사관을 떠날 수 있으며, 미국의 기소 진행에 대해서는 아는 바가 없으며, 이에 개입할 수 없다고 주장했다.

2010년 <위키리크스>에 공개된 스트랫포의 직원 레나 벨이 작성한 이메일에는 ‘호의적인 정부에 어산지의 체포와 송환을 위한 활동이 요청될 것이라는 것이 기본적인 사실이다. 닉 밀러가 나에게 말하길 그가 호주인이므로, 호주 정부가 이미 이를 제안했고, 미국과의 관계에 있어서 호주는 남반구의 캐나다와 같다’고 쓰여 있었다. 이 정보가 사실이라면, 호주 정부가 어산지를 기꺼이 미국으로 넘기려고 했다는 것이 된다.

얼마 전 <위키리크스>에 비밀 문서들을 전달한 첼시 매닝의 대배심 증언 소환장에 대한 보도가 나갔는데, 이에 따라 트럼프 행정부가 매닝의 비밀 문서 유출에 적극적인 역할을 했다는 혐의로 어산지를 기소하기 위한 방법을 재검토 중인 것이라는 언론들의 추측이 나오고 있다. 호주 정부가 어떤 의도에서 어산지에게 새 여권을 발급해 준 것인지 제기되는 의문도 이러한 추측과 맥락을 같이 하고 있다.

[위키리크스한국=최정미 기자]

.

What’s Behind Australia’s Decision to Suddenly Grant Julian Assange a Passport?

On February 21, 2019, the Sydney Morning Herald reported that Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) issued Julian Assange a new passport despite the fact that DFAT officials had reservations about doing so. According to the article, last year officials stated that Assange’s “entitlement to a passport” might be affected by “an arrest warrant in connection with a ‘serious foreign offence’ within the meaning of Section 13 of the Australian Passports Act 2005.”

Section 13 of the Australian Passports Act states that an application may be rejected if the applicant is subject to an arrest warrant for a serious foreign offense, is restricted from traveling because of a serious foreign offense, or if the issuance of a passport would compromise proceedings connected with a serious foreign offense. 

However, it would be extraordinary if the Australian government’s reservations last year had anything to do with a U.S. indictment or charges against Assange, some of which may include charges under the Espionage Act, since it not only went ahead and issued the passport but as recently as last week maintained that there is no evidence of any U.S. charges against Assange.

In fact, parliamentary documents dating back to 2010 reveal not only that the government rarely takes seriously evidence in Assange’s case, but also that it has embraced an entirely passive role in helping to secure his freedom, despite the fact that it has used government pressure and diplomatic power to help free other Australian citizens detained in foreign states.

Transcripts from Parliament also reveal a long-standing pattern when it comes to how the Australian government typically responds to anything Assange-related: “There is no evidence of charges or a sealed indictment against him;” and “We are not able to interfere in the legal processes of any foreign government,” are two sentences from the Australian government we should probably get used to.

This stance has been adhered to despite the fact that there is evidence of charges (evidence is different from proof); Assange has been arbitrarily detained since 2010 and imprisoned in London since 2012; political figures have publicly called for his assassination; the U.K. threatened to storm the Ecuadorian Embassy where Assange sought asylum; the UN has ruled twice that he’s being arbitrarily detained; and he’s been established both legally and professionally as a journalist.

With that said, the real question here is why the Australian government is playing nice by issuing Assange a passport yet it has refused to acknowledge evidence of a sealed indictment against him or provide him with any sort of substantial assistance to get him home in the last eight-plus years.

Australia’s abysmal record on supporting Australian journalist and publisher, Julian Assange, became clear in late 2010, when WikiLeaks published Cablegate — a collection of U.S. diplomatic cables that in its entirety spans over 35 years and includes over 270 U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic missions around the world.  At the time, the Australian government established a “whole-of-government” WikiLeaks task force similar in nature to the 2010 U.S. WikiLeaks Task Force (WTF) that was created to “make an inventory of the leaked cables” and to report on their impact.

The Australian task force was established by then Attorney-General Robert McClelland at the behest of the Department of the Prime Minister Cabinet, who then became the chair of the group. Other agencies involved included the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Department of Defence, Office of National Assessments, and the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Their job was to closely monitor future Cablegate publications while the AFP was tasked with determining if Assange had broken any laws.

In the meantime, the Australian government contemplated canceling Assange’s passport while then-Prime Minister Julia Gillard publicly decried the publication as a “grossly irresponsible thing to do and an illegal thing to do,” despite the fact that the AFP had not concluded its investigation nor had she been briefed on any alleged illegalities. On December 17, 2010, the AFP concluded that it could not “identify any criminal offence where Australia would have jurisdiction.”

Undeterred by the AFP’s findings and uninterested in protecting an Australian citizen, two months later former Senator and current Australian High Commissioner to the United Kingdom George Brandis asked former AFP Commissioner Tony Negus if the AFP had looked into Assange’s “personal involvement” in the “solicitation of the cables or the posting of the cables.”

Brandis’ question, whether purposely or not, served as a U.S.-government talking point that Assange was directly involved with the procurement of documents that Chelsea Manning allegedly leaked to WikiLeaks — propaganda that seems to have originated publicly with the now-deceased hacker and FBI snitch Adrian Lamo and Wired journalist Kevin Poulsen, and that may be one of the charges used against Assange.

After publishing five major publications during 2010, including a U.S. Intelligence report on WikiLeaks, Collateral Murder, the Afghan War Diary, the Iraq War Logs, and Cablegate, Assange had made some powerful enemies, but even political figures calling his assassination didn’t rouse the Australian government’s interest. After being questioned about comments — made by former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin and the former senior advisor to the Canadian prime minister, Tom Flanagan — that Assange should be “hunted down” and assassinated, then-Minister of Foreign Affairs Kevin Rudd essentially responded that any threats that had occurred should be referred to the United States and Canada.

In the Senate, former Senator Scott Ludlam who fought tirelessly for Assange over the years, tried to address the threats Assange was facing on several occasions, including the possibility of being “transferred without any due process,” also known as “temporary surrender.”  During a May 2012 Senate hearing, Ludlam asked the AFP if it would get involved in any situation in which an Australian citizen was being threatened with assassination or extrajudicial killing overseas, to which AFP Commissioner Negus admitted that AFP would need a referral from the Minister of Foreign Affairs — a referral that never came despite “repeated threats of assassination by senior American military officials and civilian political figures.”
And when then-Prime Minister Julia Gillard was confronted with a question about “senior figures in the United States” calling for Assange’s assassination, Gillard effectively ignored the question and responded with the government’s usual rhetoric, “The Australian government cannot interfere in the judicial processes of other countries,” as if death threats fell under this category.

On February 27, 2012, WikiLeaks started publishing over five million leaked emails from Stratfor, a private global intelligence firm located in Texas, called The Global Intelligence Files. One email in particular, written by Stratfor’s Chief Security Officer Fred Burton, stood out: “Not for Pub — We have a sealed indictment on Assange. Pls protect.”

Although Burton’s statement looks like a slam dunk on whether or not evidence exists that the U.S. has charged Assange, the Australian government doesn’t see it that way, nor has it ever.

Two days after WikiLeaks started publishing The Global Intelligence Files, Ludlam asked then-Senator Chris Evans, “How long has the prime minister known of the existence of this sealed indictment?” to which Evans responded, “The Australian government is not aware of any charges by the U.S. government against Mr. Assange.” Ludlam later retorted:

So, even though some ex-State Department guy in Texas running a little intelligence organisation apparently knows…the Australian government apparently does not.”

Three months later, Ludlam addressed the Stratfor email with former Senator Bob Carr, who had recently become Minister for Foreign Affairs:

Ludlam: “What can you tell us about the existence or otherwise of a sealed indictment issued by the United States Department of Justice, which would presumably come with an extradition order back to the United States?”

Carr: “We have seen no evidence that such a sealed indictment exists.”

Ludlam: “Have you sought such evidence?”

Carr: “We have not sought evidence.”

Documents released under a FOIA request show that in mid-2012, then-Minister for Foreign Affairs Kevin Rudd acknowledged that a secret grand jury had been impanelled in the Eastern District of Virginia, stating: “I understand that grand juries can issue indictments under seal, and that theoretically one could already have been issued for Mr. Assange.” 

And yet a year later the Sydney Morning Herald reported that, when asked about the Australian government’s interest in whether or not there was still an ongoing U.S. grand jury investigation into Julian Assange and WikiLeaks’ activities, Carr responded that “no further inquiries would be made because it doesn’t affect Australian interest.” In an even more dismal display of non-support of an Australian citizen, he added that he wasn’t going to allocate any resources to it.

The day after the Stratfor release, Ludlam also moved for the Senate to recognize Assange as a journalist. But, despite his best efforts, to this day the Australian government refuses to do so regardless of Assange’s history: Assange was awarded The Economist New Media Award in 2008, the Amnesty International U.K. Media Award in 2009, and the Sam Adams Award, Le Monde Readers’ Choice Award for Person of the Year, and TIME Person of the Year in 2010.

He was also granted the Sydney Peace Foundation Gold Medal, the Australian Walkley Award, the Martha Gellhorn prize for journalism, the Italian International Piero Passetti Journalism Prize of the National Union of Italian Journalists, and the Spanish Jose Couso Press Freedom of Expression Award in 2011. Recently, he was nominated for the 2019 Nobel Peace Prize.

But most importantly, on November 2, 2011, the Queen’s Bench Division of the British High Court recognized Assange as a journalist, as did a London tribunal during a FOIA case filed by journalist Stefania Maurizi. The tribunal also recognized WikiLeaks as a media organization

A few months after the Stratfor release, Assange lost his Supreme Court extradition appeal and immediately sought asylum from Ecuador. He entered the Ecuadorian Embassy in London on June 19, 2012, and, just one day before Ecuador was to publicly announce its decision to grant Assange asylum, things came to a boil. The U.K. threatened to storm the embassy.

Ecuador denounced the threats as “political suicide;” the MSM called the U.K.’s reckless move “unprecedented;” and WikiLeaks stated that it condemned “in the strongest possible terms the U.K.’s resort to intimidation.” But, despite the backlash, the U.K. defended its actions by resurrecting a 1987 British law about “revocation of diplomatic status of a building,” and reinforced its security detail around the embassy.

Former Ecuador Foreign Minister Ricardo Patino stated that any move to assault the embassy would be a “flagrant violation of the Vienna Convention,” and the Australian attorney general at the time, Nicola Roxon, commented that the DFAT’s consular services were limited but that she had an “absolute interest in the case.” Parliament was another story.

Ludlam addressed the Senate during the height of the crisis:

My question is to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Senator Bob Carr. Minister, in response to several carloads of metropolitan police entering the building that houses the Ecuadorian Embassy in the middle of the night London time, cordoning off the street and threatening to break the door down and threatening to rezone the embassy, have you or the High Commissioner in London made representations to the United Kingdom to not violate the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations by entering the premises of the Ecuadorian embassy without the consent of the head of mission?”

Carr responded:

Australia, of course, is not a party to this decision. It is a matter between Mr. Assange and the governments of Ecuador and the United Kingdom…[the] Australian government cannot intervene in the U.K. legal process.”

First, the U.K.’s decision to storm a foreign country’s embassy makes everyone who’s party to the Vienna Convention party to the U.K.’s decision to violate that convention. The U.K.’s threats were not just a danger to Assange but, had they actually followed through with their threat, it would have been a serious violation of international law. Any state that is part of the Vienna Convention should have been concerned, including Australia. The fact that the Minister of Foreign Affairs wasn’t put off at all by these events speaks volumes about the political nature of Assange’s case.

The Australian government has stated on numerous occasions that it has reached out to foreign governments about Assange’s case but Parliament hearings and media reports tend to reflect that this generally means reiterating his right to due process, nothing more. Additionally, it’s questionable how much time the government spends doing that.

For instance, during a February 11, 2016 Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation Committee hearing, then-DFAT’s First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, Jon Philp, admitted that the government had not been in contact with Swedish authorities since December 2011. That’s a more-than-five-year period during which Sweden dragged out its investigation by refusing to interview Assange in London, while Australia appears to have done literally nothing diplomatically in terms of the Swedish investigation.

Furthermore, when confronted with a 2015 report from the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention that stated Assange was (and still is) being arbitrarily detained, then-Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade Peter Varghese both declared that the decision was not legally binding and then admitted that the Australian government had made no “representations at all of any kind,” to Swedish or U.K. officials in terms of the ruling.

On May 31, 2017, Ludlam brought up the UN Working Group’s decision in front of the Senate committee, this time with regards to its subsequent 2016 finding that Assange was being arbitrarily detained and again Jon Philp — as well as former Senator George Brandis, who had become the attorney general by that time — maintained that the decision was not legally binding.

Ludlam responded: “That is remarkable. It is basically an entirely selective interpretation and selective respect and regard for important UN working groups.”

And although Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has been given credit for Assange’s new passport, on February 6, 2016, the day after the Working Group’s decision was released, Bishop released a statement confirming that she had read the report and was “seeking legal advice on its implications for Mr. Assange, as an Australian citizen.” However, a response to a FOIA request revealed that four days later both Jon Philp and the then-director of the Australian Passports Office advised the foreign minister on the UN decision:

We recommend we not seek to ‘resolve’ Mr. Assange’s case following the WGAD opinion, as we are unable to intervene in the due process of another country’s court proceedings or legal matters, and we have full confidence in the UK and Swedish judicial system.”

The FOIA documents also revealed that Bishop stated: “The U.K. and Sweden have rejected the WGAD opinion and, like Australia, do not recognise the opinion of the UN working groups as legally binding.” It would be another two and half years before Assange would be granted a new passport.

In 2016, Assange argued that the UN Working Group’s decisions were indeed legally binding, stating that they are “an opinio juris, which is higher in the hierarchy of international norms,” and that they are “part of the founding basis of the United Nations which the U.K. and Sweden are part of.” After former U.K. Foreign Minister Philip Hammond called the decision “ridiculous,” Assange shot back that the “lawfulness of my detention or otherwise is now a matter of settled law, adding:

They cannot now seek to object to the findings of a process which they themselves were involved in for 16 months. A jurisdiction which they submitted to, recognized, and, in part, founded together with their early involvement in the United Nations.”

You can’t decide that you are going to recognize a forum, take place in proceedings, respond to the other party, and then at the end when you don’t like the outcome because you have been breaking the law and you don’t even bother to appeal, come out with press statements and say, ‘Well, we disagree,’ or engage in purely superfluous ad hominem attacks like saying that a finding is ‘ridiculous.’”

But object is exactly what everyone did. On June 19, 2017, Bishop reiterated that the decision wasn’t legally binding and pointed out that it was directed at the U.K. and Sweden, not Australia. She went on to say that Assange had avoided “lawful arrest” by remaining in the embassy and that the government cannot “intervene in the legal processes of another country.” But that’s exactly what Julie Bishop did with a another case.

Peter Greste is an Australian journalist who was arrested by Egyptian authorities in 2013 and then charged and sentenced to seven years in prison on terrorism-related charges (in this case, reporting). At the time of Greste’s arrest, Julie Bishop indulged the public with the government’s usual rhetoric, “It is not possible for another nation to interfere in the criminal proceedings of another country.” However, she added, “we will continue to press our position that he should be given conditional release while we consider what more we can do to seek his release overall,” despite the fact of an ongoing court case. There’s more.

In a 2015 sit-down aired by ABC News between Bishop and Greste after his early release, Bishop told him that the Australian government made “representations to the Egyptian authorities” that their retrial of Greste “should not have gone ahead.” Bishop also stated:

I spoke to [Egyptian] Foreign Minister [Sameh] Shoukry on July 16 and set out quite plainly Australia’s position, that we wanted you to be able to clear your name, that we would not accept the verdict as being evidence of your guilt, and that it would have ramifications for the relationship and for Egypt’s reputation more generally.”

“[R]amifications for the relationship and for Egypt’s reputation more generally.” It appears that Australia absolutely interfered in the legal process of a foreign state by pressuring or, rather, threatening Egypt with ramifications. Not only that, Bishop went on to say that the Australian government put forth a “concerted campaign of advocacy” involving “high-level diplomatic contacts with the United States, the European Union, the United Nations and countries in the Middle East.”

In a 2014 hearing, former Australian Greens Senator Christine Milne stated:

It is well worth nothing that this is also about the safety of journalists and a free and fair press. Mr. Greste has worked for Reuters, for CNN, for the BBC; he is a well-known, respected journalist accused of very serious crimes. I do not want to see a situation — as occurred previously with Colin Russell — where there is not the level of political engagement that is necessary.

I call on the prime minister to intervene in the case of Peter Greste as soon as he possibly can, because the charges that Peter Greste now faces are serious…I believe he was doing his job as a journalist and we should support him in what he was doing. As an Australian citizen, we should stand up for him.”

Note that there is no mention of Julian Assange. And this from Senator Mitch Fifield:

The Australian government is deeply concerned about the ongoing detention of Mr. Peter Greste by Egyptian authorities. Mr. Greste was detained, along with his colleagues, during the normal course of his work as a journalist.

Journalists have a legitimate role to play in any democracy…The Minister for Foreign Affairs has raised Mr. Greste’s case directly with Egypt’s foreign minister and the Egyptian ambassador to Australia, and will continue to do so.”

Again, former Senator Milne:

I believe they [consular staff] are doing everything they possibly can to serve the best interests of Peter Greste and everything they can to argue for his release. But this is not about the consular staff; this is about where the politics takes it.

The Prime Minister needs to reassure Peter Greste’s family that, at the highest levels of this government, as well as through the Parliament, everybody stands behind Peter Greste and that we are all doing all we can to get Peter Greste home as quickly as possible.”

Former Senator Jane Prentice even noted that the Australian government had created a “multi-pronged strategy” to assist Greste, which included “making direct and high-level representation to a number of other governments.”

And after Greste was convicted by an Egyptian court and sentenced, then-attorney general for Australia, George Brandis, stated: “The government will be lodging a formal request imminently with President el-Sisi, seeking his intervention in the matter.”

If that isn’t interference in a legal process, I don’t know what is. And this case is a perfect example of why the Australian government refuses to recognize Assange as a journalist.

Despite any reservations the Australian government may have had about issuing Assange a new passport, those concerns appear to have absolutely nothing to do with any charges filed by the United States or issued by a U.S. grand jury.  In a more recent hearing on October 25, 2018, DFAT Chief Legal Officer James Larsen confirmed that Assange had been issued a passport.  At the same time, DFAT First Assistant Secretary, Consular and Crisis Management Division, Andrew Todd argued that Assange should hand himself over to U.K. authorities, despite being reminded that the potential exists for Assange to be extradited.

The same message permeated throughout a Senate hearing just last week where Larsen, Todd, and former Minister of Defence, Senator Marise Ann Payne, who is currently serving as the Minister for Foreign Affairs, argued that Assange is not being arbitrarily detained; he can leave the embassy whenever he wants (and that he should leave); they are not aware of any U.S. charges against him; and that they are in no position to interfere in his legal matters. So, despite being fully aware that Assange will likely be extradited to the U.S. to face the Trump administration’s persecution of journalists and America’s long-reaching arm of the law, his home country is essentially pushing for that very outcome.

Furthermore, during the October 25th hearing, Todd admitted that he wasn’t aware of “any discussion about a pathway” to bring Assange home; and just last week, Larsen couldn’t answer whether or not the government had sought assurances that an extradition notice doesn’t exist.  It’s not surprising that the Australian government doesn’t want to show its hand but, despite its best efforts, WikiLeaks has been happy to do it for them.

In a December 1, 2010 Stratfor email released by WikiLeaks, Stratfor employee Lena Bell wrote:

Basic fact is that any move to arrest the guy (assuming they get an indictment for him) would require that a friendly government do it and then extradite him. Nick Miller told me the Australians have already offered to do this, as Assange is an Australian citizen, and Australia is the Canada of the southern hemisphere when it comes to its relations with the U.S.”

If this information is true, it shows that after the AFP had already found that Assange had broken no laws, the Australian government was willing to conjure up charges in order to hand him over to the United States. 

Just yesterday The New York Times reported that Chelsea Manning has received a subpoena to testify before a grand jury. Although they reported that it’s unknown what prosecutors want to ask her, the subpoena was issued in the Eastern District of Virginia — the same district where a secret grand jury allegedly issued a sealed indictment for Assange, as well as where a cut-and-paste error last year inadvertently revealed Assange’s name in filed court documents, setting off alarm bells that indeed the U.S. had secretly charged the Australian journalist and publisher.

According to the Times article, “there are multiple reasons to believe that the subpoena is related to the investigation of Mr. Assange,” and there have been indications prosecutors want to talk to her about pertinent past statements that Manning has made. Additionally, according to Julian Assange’s 2013 affidavit, the case number on Manning’s subpoena, “10GJ3793,” matches the grand jury’s case number in the Eastern District of Virginia. More documents on the case can be found through web.archive.org.

It seems likely that the Trump administration is reexamining options to charge Assange for allegedly taking an active role in helping Manning procure documents that she then leaked to WikiLeaks.

So, with Australia’s long-standing history of denying any evidence that suggests the U.S. has charged their own citizen; taking a backseat to historical attacks against a journalist; encouraging their own citizen to risk extradition to the United States; failing to do all that it can to help Assange get home; and engaging in standardized rhetoric while taking a passive stance in Assange’s case, in order to remain in the employ of the United States — one has to wonder why Australia reissued Assange a passport and whether it’s really safe for him to go home at all.

6677sky@naver.com