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  기 밀 SEOUL 002529


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  국방부망 배포²⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 08/16/2017


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  태그: KN³⁾, KS⁴⁾, PGOV⁵⁾, PREL⁶⁾, ECON⁷⁾, EINV⁸⁾


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  제 목: 남북 정상회담: 외교부 장관과 통일부 장관, 비핵화와 경제 협력을 함께 추진한다고 밝혀


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  참조: 가. A. SEOUL 2481 나. B. SEOUL 2410


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  분류자: 알렉산더 버시바우 대사. 근거 1.4 (b/d)


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/10/22 06:45

1. 
   
   남북경협위 '새 방식' 적용한 경공업-광업 협력 인터넷한겨레


2. 
   
   남북 광물자원 공동개발 활성화 조짐 에너지경제

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002529
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2017
TAGS: KN [Korea (North)], KS [Korea (South)], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PREL [External Political Relations], ECON [Economic Conditions], EINV [Foreign Investments]
SUBJECT: ROK-DPRK SUMMIT: FOREIGN AND UNIFICATION MINISTERS
SAY DENUCLEARIZATION AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION GO TOGETHER
 
 
REF: A. A. SEOUL 2481
B. B. SEOUL 2410
 
Classified By: AMB. Alexander Vershbow. Reasons 1.4 (b/d)
 
-------
SUMMARY
-------
 
¶1. (C) Expanded North-South economic cooperation is only
possible if the DPRK continues to make progress on
denuclearization, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Song
Min-soon told the Ambassador at an August 20 meeting.
 
-- Song also said the summit would be about implementing
existing agreements between the two Koreas, rather than
striking out in a new direction, noting the modest tone of
President Roh Moo-hyun's August 15 speech on the summit.
 
-- Similarly, Minister of Unification Lee Jae-joung told the
Ambassador during a separate meeting on August 20 that the
summit was an opportunity to enlarge and strengthen economic
ties between the two Koreas, in the context of
denuclearization, and was also meant to contribute to an
improvement in U.S.-DPRK relations.
 
-- Both ministers offered to continue consulting with the USG
on the summit, and said September's progress in the Six-Party
Talks would affect the summit.
 
-- Separately, MOU Director General for Unification Policy
Planning Um Jong-sik told us that ROKG statements to the
effect that the agenda for the summit remains fluid are an
understatement, since the DPRK has shared only a bare-bones
schedule for meeting venues and there is currently no plan to
sit down to work things out in more detail before October 2.
 
End Summary.
 
------------------------------------
SUMMIT WILL INCLUDE DENUCLEARIZATION
------------------------------------
 
¶2. (C) Foreign Minister Song Min-soon told the Ambassador at
an August 20 meeting at his residence that President Roh
Moo-hyun hoped to use the October 2-4 summit with Kim Jong-il
to expand economic ties with the North, but that South
Koreans would not stand for expanded economic cooperation
unless the DPRK continued to make progress on
denuclearization. The prospect of expanded economic
cooperation, in connection with denuclearization, would be an
added incentive for the DPRK to stick with the Six-Party
Talks process. President Roh would make clear that
denuclearization was part of the framework for expanded
cooperation between the two Koreas, Song said.
 
¶3. (C) Citing the "not too ambitious" goals in President
Roh's August 15 National Day speech, Song said that the
summit was not intended to "turn the tide of history" but was
instead to focus on implementing the four existing agreements
between the two Koreas: the 1972 Joint Communique, the 1991
South-North Basic Agreement, the 1992 Joint Declaration of
the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the June
2000 South-North Joint Declaration (ref A). The 1991
agreement was about political reconciliation, economic
cooperation and military confidence-building measures, and
now needed to be implemented; the 1992 agreement was about
denuclearization and related to the current Six-Party Talks
process, where denuclearization was now underway "after
twists and turns." Progress in the Six-Party Talks during
September would set the tone for the summit.
 
¶4. (C) Song agreed with the Ambassador's suggestions that the
ROKG might need to use the summit to press for progress on
denuclearization, if DPRK performance lags, and that it would
be useful to have Kim Jong-il affirm his commitment to
implementing the Six-Party agreements during the summit or in
a joint statement. But Song was not sure that Kim Jong-il
would agree to the latter, even though logically he should.
 
¶5. (C) Minister of Unification Lee Jae-joung began a separate
August 20 meeting with the Ambassador by saying that a "main
objective" of the summit would be to facilitate the success
 
of the Six-Party Talks. The ROK saw the summit as a chance
to support the "ongoing enuclearization" process under the
February 13, 2007 agreement, and would discuss
denuclearization with the DPRK. Asked whether Kim Jong-il
could be expected to voice a commitment to denuclearization,
or whether there would be a joint statement that would
mention denuclearization, Lee said that the ROKG, including
President Roh Moo-hyun, would "like to hear from Kim Jong-il
that he wants to resolve" the denuclearization issue and
would work the issue. But there was not yet any decision
about having a joint statement, or, if so, what it would
contain. He implied that the issue would remain open until
the leaders meet, saying that he expected a frank discussion
of all the issues on both sides. He added that DPRK
interlocutors had told him that normalizing U.S.-DPRK
relations was a key objective, implying that the DPRK would
remain motivated to continue denuclearization.
 
-----------------------------------------
ECONOMIC COOPERATION IS FOR THE LONG TERM
-----------------------------------------
 
¶6. (C) In keeping with the joint August 8 press statement
announcing the summit, Lee said, the agenda would also
include working toward peace on the Korean peninsula and
toward increased economic cooperation. Lee said the two
themes were expected to reinforce each other, and North Korea
had expressed interest in both. He noted that the 2000
summit focused on unification, but the 2007 summit would have
a wider agenda. The ROKG's goal was to go from the current
level of economic exchange and cooperation to the level of
mutually beneficial development and investment. Hence, the
ROKG would seek economic projects that would benefit both the
South and the North. As an example, he cited a recent
agreement to barter North Korean minerals for South Korean
light industrial materials (ref B). Another likely subject
was expansion of the Kaesong Industrial Complex, but there
was no agreement on joint projects as yet. Lee ended his
comments on economic cooperation by saying that the two sides
are likely to agree on a concept for expanded economic
cooperation at the summit, but that projects may only be
worked out later and carried out in connection with
denuclearization.
 
¶7. (C) Asked whether the summit would take up South Korean
abductees, expanded family reunions, or North-South
exchanges, Lee said that these issues were under inter-agency
discussion in connection with summit preparation. He added
that the two leaders could be expected to have a frank
discussion, without being tied to an agenda. Discussions
could also touch on U.S.-DPRK and Japan-DPRK relations.
 
¶8. (C) Song dismissed media reports that the ROKG might
decide to discuss the Northern Limit Line (NLL) with the
North. The ROKG position, which the DPRK knew well, was that
the NLL could be discussed in connection with implementation
of the 1992 Basic Agreement. For that reason, the ROKG
continued to favor Defense Minister talks. As an interim
measure, the ROKG had proposed that the two sides establish a
joint fishing area around the NLL, but the DPRK had rejected
the proposal. Song foresaw no change in that situation as a
result of the summit.
 
----------------------------
COMMENT: PREPARING FOR WHAT?
----------------------------
 
¶9. (C) It is clear that the various South Korean ministries
are busy preparing for the upcoming summit. Our MOFAT and
MOU colleagues are in their offices at nights and on
weekends, dusting off old proposals and trying to come up
with new ideas. However, nobody knows how Pyongyang will
react to them, because there is currently no pre-summit
meeting planned between the two sides to deal with the
substance or even the agenda. According to our MOU contacts,
during the one preparation meeting held last week with the
North Koreans, the two sides agreed only on logistics, such
as transportation, press pool, hotel, etc. The agenda
remained blank pages, filled with "Day One: lunch followed by
meeting, etc." Our MOU contacts were certain that there
would be no fleshing out of the agenda, because the North
Korean response would be that it was up to Kim Jong-il.
 
¶10. (C) Our contacts expect the summit discussions between
the two Korean leaders to be similar to those in 2000: very
free-wheeling conversations, with no agenda or schedule. In
2000, the summit meetings were limited to principal plus one
(Lim Dong-won with President Kim Dae-jung and Kim Yong-sun
with Kim Jong-il). Kim Jong-il would go off on a long
threatening discourse on the presence of U.S. troops in South
Korea, but then make conciliatory remarks, such as agreeing
with Kim Dae-jung that U.S. troops should perhaps remain even
after reunification of the two Koreas. Noting that President
Roh is never afraid to speak his mind, our interlocutors are
hopeful that this time around, while still without an agenda,
the discussions will be somewhat more substantive and
disciplined than in 2000.
VERSHBOW