C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001867

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2029
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], ECON [Economic Conditions], SOCI [Social Conditions], KN [Korea (North)], CH [China (Mainland)], KS [Korea (South)], JP

SUBJECT: TOP JAPANESE PYONGYANG-WATCHER ON SINO-DPRK TIES

REF: SEOUL 1672

Classified By: POL M/C James L. Wayman. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

Summary
-------

¶1. (C) Fresh from detailed discussions with longtime Chinese
and North Korean contacts in Beijing, noted Japanese
DPRK-watcher Professor Hajime Izumi told us that Premier
Wen's October trip to Pyongyang had restored China's
influence with the DPRK and put Beijing's relationship with
the North back on track. Wen's "3-5-8" aid package of food,
heavy fuel oil, and high-quality coal had done the trick,
Izumi claimed, adding that China does not want rapid progress
in the Six-Party Talks. Izumi asserted Beijing was in a
holding pattern in dealing with the ROK on major political
issues until 2012, when a new administration and OPCON
transfer would make Seoul a more promising target of
opportunity. Izumi claimed that the PLA does not believe the
North's nuclear threat could spark a regional arms race and
had concluded the threat of Japanese remilitarization was
near non-existent. End Summary.

Wen's Visit "Fixed China's DPRK Problem"...
-------------------------------------------

¶2. (C) Hajime Izumi, Director of the Center for Korean
Studies at Shizuoka University, told poloffs on November 20
that China was confident that Premier Wen Jiabao's October
2009 Pyongyang trip was a "turning point" in dealing with the
DPRK. Izumi, who had just concluded meetings in Beijing with
longtime official PRC and DPRK interlocutors, noted that
China's relations with Pyongyang had soured after the North's
unannounced missile launch in April and nuclear test in May.
China's subsequent support for the UNSC Presidential
Statement condemning the test had further complicated
relations that Izumi claimed had now been repaired by the Wen
visit and Kim Jong-il's face-saving apparent agreement to
return to the Six-Party Talks.

...For a Price: "3-5-8" Aid Package
-----------------------------------

¶3. (C) According to Izumi, the North's alleged willingness to
return to the Six-Party Talks came at the price of 300,000
metric tons (MT) of food, 500,000 MTs of heavy fuel oil, and
800,000 MTs of high-quality coal -- which PRC officials
referred to as the "3-5-8 package." The "3-5-8 package"
carried significant symbolism, as it was the same package
Beijing gave Pyongyang in 1965, as China emerged from the
economic chaos caused by the Great Leap Forward and offered
aid to the struggling DPRK. Delivery of the latest 3-5-8
package began in September and would be absent from official
PRC trade statistics, according to Izumi's sources.

China's DPRK Policy: "Business as Usual"
----------------------------------------

¶4. (C) Izumi suggested it now appeared that for Beijing it
was back to business as usual regarding the DPRK. Lingering
mistrust existed over the nuclear tests, but the PLA was
confident it could deal with the DPRK as it had in the past.
The Chinese leadership allegedly viewed the North Koreans as
"just crazy enough" to actually use military force against
China, so the PLA had determined to improve bilateral
relations and "hold them close." Izumi noted that the
party-to-party link between Beijing and Pyongyang gave the
two countries a unique relationship, but ties were far from
normal. Asked if China had another redline for provocative
DPRK behavior, Izumi suggested it did not appear so.

China Prefers Slow Approach to Six-Party
----------------------------------------

¶5. (C) China was in no hurry to reconvene the Six-Party
Talks, Izumi's interlocutors had said, emphasizing that
Beijing was focused on results more than process. As an
issue of face, Beijing was not interested in hosting another
round unless there were signs that real progress could be
made. Chinese officials told Izumi they would like to see at
least three U.S.-DPRK bilaterals before reconvening the
Six-Party Talks, suggesting that's what would be necessary to
get enough progress to make a next round productive.

PLA Calling Shots on DPRK Policy?
---------------------------------

¶6. (C) According to Izumi, the PLA currently has the lead on
China's DPRK policy; according to Izumi's contacts, MFA lost
the lead following a series of senior PRC visits to Pyongyang
that failed to persuade the North to return to the Six-Party
Talks. While other PRC ministries and institutions had
concluded that the DPRK was no longer the valuable buffer
state it had once been for China, the PLA was holding fast to
old, conventional wisdom. Izumi downplayed the significance
of recent criticism of the North in PRC media, claiming it
was limited to junior academics who had little influence over
policy in the near term.

China Welcomes OPCON Transfer, Dismissive of LMB
--------------------------------------------- ---

¶7. (C) According to Izumi, senior PRC leaders viewed the
transfer of wartime operational control of Combined Forces
Korea from USFK to the ROK (OPCON Transfer) scheduled for
2012 as an opportunity to split the U.S.-ROK alliance and
dismissed ROK President Lee Myung-bak as a CEO, not a
statesman, Izumi claimed. Beijing had little interest in
working with Lee and had no plans to engage Seoul on
substantive political or security issues until after OPCON
transfer and the next ROK presidential election in 2012,
Izumi asserted.

"Japan? Who's Afraid of Japan?"
-------------------------------

¶8. (C) Izumi said his PLA contacts did not find credible the
threat of a regional arms race triggered by the North's
nuclear program because they do not believe Japan is capable
of remilitarizing. They commented that Japan "just sat and
watched" two North Korean nuclear tests. Izumi's PLA
contacts also noted Japan had decreased its military budget
during the past seven years and believed that, as long as
that trend continued, China had no reason to fear Japan.
STEPHENS