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  기 밀 SEOUL 001841


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 09/17/2018


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  태그: PBTS²⁾, PGOV³⁾, PHSA⁴⁾, PINS⁵⁾, MARR⁶⁾, KS⁷⁾, KN⁸⁾


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  제 목: 세드니 부차관보 이상희 국방장관과 회동


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  참조: SECSTATE 96122 (IRAQ COALITION DEMARCHE)


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  분류자: 정치 공사 참사관 조셉 윤⁹⁾. 근거 1.4 (b/d).


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/09/01 00:25

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001841
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/17/2018
TAGS: PBTS [National Boundaries, Territories, and Sovereignty], PGOV [Internal Governmental Affairs], PHSA [High Seas Affairs], PINS [National Security], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], KS [Korea (South)], KN [Korea (North)]
SUBJECT: DASD SEDNEY MEETING WITH ROK DEFENSE MINISTER
 
REF: SECSTATE 96122 (IRAQ COALITION DEMARCHE)
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun REASONS 1.4 (b/d).
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Following the end of SPI-19 (septel), DASD
David Sedney and Ambassador Vershbow met with ROK Minister of
National Defense Lee Sang-hee. The Ambassador delivered
reftel points on the pending announcement by the Government
of Iraq regarding reductions in Coalition forces that would
include withdrawal of ROK troops by the end of the year. The
Minister responded with a series of questions, but otherwise
accepted the news with neither complaint nor apparent
pleasure. He said he shared DASD Sedney's largely positive
assessment of SPI-19, but also agreed that difficult issues
remained to be resolved in the lead up to his October 17
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) with Secretary Gates.
Lee cited the environmental issues relating to camp returns
and public rollout of the cost and timeline for the Yongsan
Relocation Plan (YRP) as the most sensitive matters on the
agenda. He compared observations with the Ambassador and
DASD Sedney on reports that North Korean leader Kim Jong-il
had taken ill, and pledged close U.S.-ROK information sharing
in the days ahead. Lee advised that it would be important
for the SCM to publicly demonstrate the strength and
readiness of the U.S.-ROK Alliance to deal with what may
come. END SUMMARY
 
CONCLUDING THE ZAYTUN MISSION
-----------------------------
 
¶2. (C) Following the end of Security Policy Initiative talks
in Seoul (SPI-19), David Sedney, Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense for East Asia, met with ROK Minister of National
Defense Lee Sang-hee to coordinate on Iraq, Afghanistan and
other U.S.-ROK Alliance concerns. He was accompanied to the
meeting by Ambassador Vershbow. The Ambassador delivered
reftel talking points on the pending announcement by the
Government of Iraq about reductions in Coalition forces that
would include complete withdrawal of the ROK's aytun Unit by
the end of the year. The Ambassador stated that the Zaytun
troops had completed their mission with honor and had earned
the gratitude of the Iraqi and American people. He added
that much work still needed to be done in Iraq and that
non-military contributions by the ROKG would be welcomed.
Sedney added that the ROK military had earned the respect and
admiration of the U.S. for their performance.
 
¶3. (C) The Minister of National Defense responded with a
series of questions concerning the Government of Iraq's
decision:
 
-- Are reduction plans for U.S. Forces in place already?
-- Are further reductions in U.S. Forces planned?
-- What will be the command relationship for U.S. Forces
after the UN mandate expires?
-- What were the criteria for asking some countries to remain
in the Coalition in 2009?
-- What did the Ambassador mean by non-military assistance?
A PRT?
 
¶4. (C) DASD Sedney answered that the President had announced
a reduction of 8,000 U.S. troops in his September 9 National
Defense University speech, but that further reductions in
U.S. Forces were dependent upon on-going discussions with the
Government of Iraq. Sedney also explained that the U.S.-Iraq
General Agreement and Status of Forces Agreement were still
being negotiated and that the Government of Iraq had decided
which countries it would ask to stay on based on Iraqi
judgment of Iraq's security requirements. The Ambassador
defined non-military assistance as technical, humanitarian
and financial contributions, including investment guarantees
aimed at economic development assistance.
 
¶5. (C) The Minister thanked them for answering his
questions. He said that if the ROK was to be asked to
redeploy to somewhere else his government would need full
details and would require close consultations on the matter.
 
POSITIVE SPI-19, BUT DIFFICULT ISSUES REMAIN FOR SCM
--------------------------------------------- -------
¶6. (C) DASD Sedney gave a positive assessment of the
just-concluded SPI-19 talks, but noted that it had taken late
night and early morning senior-level meetings to achieve
progress toward resolving environmental issues relating to
camp returns and reaching a compromise solution on the
Combined Defense Improvements Project (CDIP) funding issue.
He predicted to the Minister that Secretary Gates would want
to discuss Afghanistan at their upcoming October 17 Security
Consultative Meeting in Washington. He praised the success
of the August 2008 Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) military
exercise (at which ROK commanders took the lead for the first
time), and expressed our appreciation to Minister Lee and
President Lee Myung-bak for their personal participation in
the exercise.
 
ROKG SENSITIVITY ON CAMP RETURNS
--------------------------------
 
¶7. (C) Referring to the evolving deal on CDIP, DASD Sedney
said he hoped that U.S. and ROK Alliance managers could do a
similarly good job of handling the sensitive environmental
issue relating to the return of Camp Hialeah and eight other
former U.S. Forces Korea facilities to Korea by the end of
this year. The Ambassador added that he had been in Busan
the previous day and that Busan Mayor Huh had said he was
eagerly awaiting the return of the Hialeah property, which
the city plans to turn into a public park.
 
¶8. (C) Defense Minister Lee replied that he thought SPI had
once again proven to be a very valuable tool for effective
Alliance management. He agreed that UFG had been a very good
exercise, with many lessons learned. He cautioned, however,
that several sensitive Alliance issues remained to be
resolved and that the LMB Administration would prefer to move
cautiously, for fear that mismanagement of those issues could
result in renewed anti-government or anti-U.S. protests. He
cited base returns as particularly worrisome, stating that
the City of Busan wanted Hialeah returned quickly, but that
the central government could be heavily criticized by the
public depending on how it addressed the environmental
concerns prior to handover. He and DASD Sedney agreed that
it was positive that the SOFA Special Joint Committee on Camp
Returns is scheduled to meet on September 30. They pledged
that both sides would work in the lead up to that meeting to
design an appropriate joint environmental assessment process
with which to resolve the issue.
 
YRP COST/TIMELINE ALSO VERY SENSITIVE
-------------------------------------
 
¶9. (C) MND Lee warned that the cost and timeline for
completion of the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP), as well as
when and how the cost and timeline would be disclosed to the
Korean public, was also a highly sensitive subject in ROK
domestic political arena. He urged that we be "wise and not
too hasty" in the way we handle the issue.
 
INFORMATION SHARING ON KJI'S HEALTH
-----------------------------------
 
¶10. (C) MND Lee turned the discussion to intelligence, media
reports and rumors indicating that Kim Jong-il had been
stricken by illness -- possibly a stroke. Lee said there
were many mysteries relating to KJI and that we should devote
serious thought to what it all meant. He assured that MND
was devoting a lot of effort to how the North Korean
leadership situation could develop, and pledged that he would
work with USFK on that. He said the ROKG would not hesitate
to ask the USG if/when it needs anything from us in that
regard.
 
¶11. (C) EAP/K Director Kurt Tong stated that it was our
working assumption that KJI was in fact seriously ill, but
could recover. He advised calm and suggested it would be
unwise to fuel speculation being circulated by the media
since that could provoke the wrong reaction from the North.
Lee agreed, noting that no one outside of North Korea had
known that KJI's father, Kim Il-sung, had passed away until
the DPRK made the announcement some twelve hours after his
death. The Ambassador asked that the Minister share any new
information the ROK may acquire on the developing leadership
situation. DASD Sedney assured the Minister that the U.S.
wished to work closely with the ROK and that we stood ready
to be the ROKG's partner in every sense of that word.
 
PREPARING FOR THE OCT 17 DEFENSE MINISTERIAL
--------------------------------------------
 
¶12. (C) Looking ahead to his October 17 SCM meeting with
Secretary Gates, MND Lee advised that it was most important
that the meeting display the strength of the U.S.-ROK
Alliance. He also said it should demonstrate to the public
how we will address our security concerns. DASD Sedney noted
and the Minister of National Defense agreed that since it
would be the last SCM under the Bush Administration and the
first for the LMB Administration it was important to make the
meeting as productive as possible.
 
¶13. (U) DASD Sedney has cleared this message.
VERSHBOW