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  비 밀 SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001881


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  국방부 국방장관실/아시아태평양보안과―그렉슨/미첼/쉬퍼/힐/베이슬라/아르클리언²⁾


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  합동 전략기획참모―밀러³⁾


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  국무부 아시아태평양, 정치·군사국/국제안보협상과⁴⁾


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  태평양사령부 J00/J01/J5⁵⁾


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  주일미군 J00/J01/J5⁶⁾


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  주한미군 J00/J01/J5⁷⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 한국 통일 이후


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  태그: PREL⁸⁾, PARM⁹⁾, MARR¹⁰⁾, MNUC¹¹⁾, KN¹²⁾, KS¹³⁾, JA¹⁴⁾


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  제 목: 그렉슨 국방부 차관보(아시아태평양보안과) 7월 16~17일 미·일·한 3자 방위회담 참석(2/4부)


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  참조: 가. 08 SECDEF 8291 나. TOKYO 1879


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  분류자: 제임스 줌월트 잠정적 대사 직무 대행¹⁵⁾ 근거 1.4 (b/d)


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/05/26 09:07


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  시리즈 1부를 보세요¹⁶⁾

1. 
   
   <핵안보회의> 韓·美·日·英·佛 "핵 및 방사성 물질 운송 보안 강화" 아주경제

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 TOKYO 001881
 
SIPDIS
 
DOD FOR OSD/APSA -
GREGSON/MITCHELL/SCHIFFER/HILL/BASALLA/ARAKEL IAN
JOINT STAFF FOR J5 - MILLER
STATE FOR EAP, PM/ISN
PACOM FOR J00/J01/J5
USFJ FOR J00/J01/J5
USFK FOR J00/J01/J5
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: AFTER KOREAN REUNIFICATION
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], MNUC [Military Nuclear Applications], KN [Korea (North)], KS [Korea (South)], JA [Japan; Okinawa; Ryukyu Islands]
SUBJECT: PART 2 OF 4 -- ASD (APSA) GREGSON PARTICIPATES IN
JULY 16-17 U.S.-JAPAN-ROK DEFENSE TRILATERAL TALKS
 
REF: A. 08 SECDEF 8291
B. TOKYO 1879
 
Classified By: James P. Zumwalt, Charge d'Affaires, a.i.; reasons 1.4 (
b/d)
 
Please see Tokyo 1879 for part 1 of this cable.
 
-------------------------------
Trilateral Forward Development:
-------------------------------
 
¶13. (SBU) USFK C-5 Col Jon Sachrison provided a synopsis of
his plenary brief on the July 8-10 multinational humanitarian
assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) conference and table
top exercise hosted by USFK in Seoul (additional details in
para 45).
 
----------
Way Ahead:
----------
 
¶14. (S) ASD Gregson concurred with Takamizawa's assertion
that the DTT ought not to be predicated on the DPRK problem
and should continue as a process for bringing the three
governments' respective capabilities and expertise together
for addressing common objectives and interests. Gregson
raised three proposals as "way ahead" projects: a trilateral
chiefs of defense (CHOD) meeting with a secure video
teleconference (SVTC); a track-1 trilateral cooperation
seminar at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies
(APCSS); and reciprocal exercise observation, involving ROK
observation of portions of the January 2010 KEEN EDGE
exercise in Japan, and Japanese observation of portions of
KEY RESOLVE/FOAL EAGLE in March 2010. The Japanese side
supported all three proposals, noting potential sensitivities
from the ROK delegation. Takamizawa commented that KEEN EDGE
participation by relevant Japanese ministries and agencies
has been expanding over the years and that ROK participation
is a natural part of such expansion.
 
--------------------------
--------------------------
U.S.-ROK BILATERAL MEETING
--------------------------
--------------------------
 
¶15. (S) In the U.S.-ROK bilateral preparatory meeting
immediately following the U.S.-Japan bilateral meeting,
Deputy Minister of Defense Kim Sang-ki stated that the ROK
government wants to develop the DTT based on the bedrock of
strong U.S.-ROK bilateral cooperation. ASD Gregson conveyed
the U.S. Government's appreciation for continued close
cooperation with the ROK government in response to North
Korea's recent activities. The U.S. delegation, he said,
sought to achieve three objectives during the plenary
session's discussions on North Korea: a shared situational
understanding of the security situation; recognition of
mutual goals and priorities in response to the North Korean
threat; and discussion of areas to sustain and improve on the
trilateral front, particularly in terms of strategic
communication and operational coordination.
 
-----------------
Response to DPRK:
-----------------
 
 
TOKYO 00001881 002 OF 004
 
 
¶16. (S) DM Kim queried whether the issue of additional North
Korea sanctions was discussed at the recent U.S.-China
defense cooperation talks and whether the U.S.-Russia summit
meeting had led to any conclusions on the DPRK issue. He
also sought U.S. views on Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin
Elbegdorj's stated desire to help resolve the DPRK nuclear
issue, adding that ROK Defense Minister Lee Sang-hee will
visit Mongolia in late July to discuss information sharing
and the DPRK. DASD Schiffer responded there was no further
clarity on China's DPRK policy in the U.S.-China talks, but
the U.S. Government continues to seek ways to influence
Beijing's decision-making process on North Korean issues.
ASD Gregson emphasized the need for Pyongyang to return to
diplomacy, underscoring the recent G8 summit communiqu's
strong condemnation of the DPRK's behavior. He explained
that the U.S. Government has been working closely with the
Mongolians since the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom
and Operation Iraqi Freedom and welcomes all diplomatic
contributions to resolving the DPRK nuclear issue.
 
----------------------------
National Defense Strategies:
----------------------------
 
¶17. (S) ASD Gregson underscored the importance of continued
bilateral consultations between the United States and the ROK
on their respective strategic review processes. He added
that the U.S. Government wants to discuss in the fall any
useful recommendations from the QDR on strengthening U.S.
force posture in the region, possibly in conjunction with
Secretary Gates' visit to the region. Consistent with the
discussions in the earlier U.S.-Japan bilateral meeting, DASD
Schiffer outlined the QDR's four primary issue areas (para
8). DM Kim highlighted that the language on the U.S. nuclear
umbrella and extended deterrence outlined in the Joint Vision
Statement from the June 16 U.S.-ROK Summit was useful in
allaying the Korean public's concerns regarding North Korea's
recent provocative actions. It would be of great importance
to have these kinds of assurances incorporated into the QDR's
contents, Kim said.
 
----------------
Missile Defense:
----------------
 
¶18. (S) USFJ Deputy J-5 Lt Col Scott Burnside touched upon
the lessons learned from the July 3-4 DPRK missile launches
and the possibility of increased trilateral cooperation.
PACOM J-5 Director MajGen Alles proposed trilateral
observation of a U.S. ballistic missile defense test shot as
a possible first step to initiating policy-level discussions
on missile defense among the three governments. DASD
Schiffer said the pace of such dialogue would not exceed the
ROK government's comfort level. DM Kim stated that he would
review the U.S. proposal upon his return to Seoul.
 
---------------------
Information Security:
---------------------
 
¶19. (S) ASD Gregson remarked that the DTT Working Group had
proposed during its March 20 meeting in Honolulu a new
discussion on information security for the DTT plenary, and
emphasized the importance of cooperation on information
security, as it is a foundational element for other forms of
trilateral cooperation. He proposed that it may be time for
the three countries to think about the advantages of pursuing
 
TOKYO 00001881 003 OF 004
 
 
a trilateral agreement on information sharing. DM Kim
recounted that Secretary Gates had highlighted the importance
of a common understanding on information protection during
the trilateral defense ministerial on the margins of the May
30 Shangri-La Dialogue. He said the ROK government would
consider the U.S. suggestion, recommending that trilateral
information sharing begin slowly and proceed "step by step."
Kim added that the ROK government understands the importance
of information security and that the Ministry of National
Defense has re-educated its staff in the wake of recent
leaks. Moreover, the ROK delegation wants to include cyber
defense as an agenda topic in next year's DTT, Kim noted.
 
---------------
Counter-piracy:
---------------
 
¶20. (C) DM Kim expressed the ROK government's gratitude for
the active support from U.S. forces for the Chung-Hae Unit's
counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden, noting that the
ROK Navy Destroyer Dae-Jo-Yeong left port on July 16 and will
commence operations on August 22. Joint Staff J-5's COL
Miller solicited the ROK's assistance in encouraging Japan to
join CTF (Combined Task Force) 151. Kim stated he will
support the U.S. position.
 
----------
Way Ahead:
----------
 
¶21. (S) DM Kim responded favorably to the proposals for a
trilateral CHOD meeting and a trilateral track-1 dialogue at
APCSS (para 14). He cautioned, however, that the ROK
government's ability to engage in reciprocal military
observer exchanges with Japan on bilateral exercises with
U.S. forces is limited due to domestic political
sensitivities in South Korea related to lingering bilateral
issues, including territorial disputes over the
Dokdo/Takeshima islets. He added that Korean dailies had
printed front-page reports on the issue that morning. He
also cited the lack of an information sharing agreement
between Korea and Japan as an issue preventing such
exchanges. Emphasizing that ROK-Japan relations are
improving, Kim stated that he will review the proposal
carefully upon returning to Korea.
 
----------------------
----------------------
DTT TRILATERAL PLENARY
----------------------
----------------------
 
----------------------------------
Response to North Korea: ROK Brief
----------------------------------
 
¶22. (S) MND Director for Defense Planning Col Jang Hyuk
outlined the ROK assessment of the regional security
situation, focusing on the DPRK's long-term goal to ensure
regime succession and strengthen its economy by 2012. Col
Jang asserted that the DPRK's objectives are three-fold: to
maintain regime stability, to obtain security assurances and
economic aid from the United States, and to gain the upper
hand in inter-Korean relations. On the political front, Kim
Jong-Il (KJI) has been making more public appearances despite
his ailing health, possibly to prepare the North Korean
masses for further difficulties. On the economic front, the
 
TOKYO 00001881 004 OF 004
 
 
DPRK is mobilizing for reconstruction. Finally, the North
Korean military has been strengthening its combat posture,
Jang added.
 
¶23. (S) Col Jang stated that the ROK expects the DPRK to
launch additional ICBMs and provoke military conflict along
the NLL or DMZ, but views actions risking "all-out-war" as
unlikely. He stressed that the ROK military is prepared to
respond to any North Korean aggression. Underscoring the
linkage of U.S.-ROK C4I systems, Jang lauded improved ROK
interagency cooperation and consistent responses to DPRK
provocations. Nevertheless, Jang remarked, improved joint
assessment and response systems, as well as increased
intelligence sharing is needed. He also stressed the need to
create a trilateral strategy for North Korea, which would
include common recognition of the need for fundamental
resolution of the DPRK threat and plans for addressing the
implications of leadership succession in North Korea. In the
trilateral context, Jang suggested the need to reinforce
intelligence sharing systems, establish consultation channels
for coordination of political strategy and strategic
communication on DPRK provocations.
 
------------------------------------
Response to North Korea: Japan Brief
------------------------------------
 
¶24. (S) MOD Strategic Planning Office Deputy Director
Takahashi assessed the DPRK's recent ballistic missile and
nuclear tests and reviewed Japan's responses and suggestions
for managing the DPRK, including recommendations for
trilateral cooperation. The Japanese government believes
that the DPRK may have tied the timing of the tests to Kim
Jong-il's succession process. It is also possible, however,
that Pyongyang had proceeded with the tests according to a
predetermined research and development schedule, while using
the succession issue intentionally to confuse the
international community. The DPRK will continue to escalate
the situation for some time, but will eventually return to
negotiations because it cannot escalate the situation
indefinitely while maintaining regime stability, Takahashi
said. North Korea is not likely, however, to denuclearize,
given: the limited extent to which the United States, Japan,
and ROK can exert pressure; the "soft" response by China,
which undermines all other parties' efforts to squeeze North
Korea; and the DPRK's expectation of eventual concessions by
the United States and others. The Japanese government,
Takahashi added, foresees a deadlocked situation with an
associated risk of sudden regime collapse, based on a simple
comparison of North Korea's potential gains from continuing
its nuclear program versus its risks.
ZUMWALT