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  기 밀 SEOUL 002077


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 10/21/2018


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  태그: MARR²⁾, PREL³⁾, PGOV⁴⁾, PINS⁵⁾, KS⁶⁾


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  제 목: 미 대사, 이상희 국방장관과 상견례


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  분류자: 캐슬린 스티븐스 대사 근거 1.4 (b/d).


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/09/01 22:36

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 002077
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/21/2018
TAGS: MARR PREL PGOV PINS KS
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON ROK MINISTER OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR KATHLEEN STEVENS. REASON 1.4 (b/d).
 
-------
SUMMARY
-------
 
¶1. (C) During her October 22 introductory office call on Lee
Sang-hee, ROK Minister of National Defense:
 
--- Ambassador Stephens and the Minister swapped positive
reports on the October 17 U.S.-ROK Security Consultative
Meeting. Lee cited in particular its helpfulness in allaying
Korean concerns regarding OPCON transfer.
 
--- The Ambassador provided assurance the USG has a strong
interest in broadening and deepening our bilateral
relationship into the 21st Century Strategic Alliance called
for by our two Presidents.
 
--- The Minister took pains to describe the domestic
political difficulties of the Lee Myung-bak Government and
urged wise leadership in resolving alliance issues.
 
--- Both agreed it appropriate to define the U.S.-ROK
alliance as more than just our security relationship. They
vowed to share thoughts in the future on how best to use
growing economic and cultural dimensions to strengthen our
overall bilateral relationship.
 
--- Lee urged that alliance leaders focus on mutual benefits
and greater transparency in their approach to alliance
management issues. He praised USFK's follow up on the
planned use of accumulated burden sharing funds as a
favorable example.
 
--- Commenting on an article in the morning papers, Lee
expressed the ROK's firm view that the relocation of the 2nd
Infantry Division be completed, as planned, by no later than
¶2014.
 
--- Looking to the future, Lee advised: 1) that we evolve out
of our military-heavy alliance by emphasizing more political
and cultural understanding; and 2) that we work to expand the
range of the alliance beyond Korea by enhancing our regional
and global cooperation. The Ambassador welcomed his vision
and pledged to work with him on ways to bring it to reality,
and explain its many benefits to the younger generation of
Koreans. END SUMMARY
 
--------------
SUCCESSFUL SCM
--------------
 
¶2. (C) On October 22, Ambassador Stephens paid her
introductory office call on General (ret.) Lee Sang-hee,
Minister of National Defense for the Republic of Korea. The
Defense Minister had recently returned from his visit to
Washington to attend the October 17 Security Consultative
Meeting (SCM) with Secretary Gates. The Minister praised the
SCM for successfully laying the foundations for the 21st
Century Strategic Alliance called for by our two Presidents.
He further emphasized that the SCM had proven to be a good
opportunity for allaying concerns in the ROK over the planned
transfer of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK
military in April 2012. He concluded with his personal
assessment that the tone of this year's SCM was much
improved. The Ambassador said that the USG also had a very
positive assessment of the outcome of the SCM. She looked
forward to working with the Minister to help show to all
audiences what was real and mutually beneficial about the
U.S.-ROK 21st Century Strategic Alliance. She assured the
Minister that whatever the result of the U.S. Presidential
election, the U.S. Government would retain a strong interest
in broadening and deepening our enhanced alliance
relationship.
 
 
--------------------------------
ROKG DOMESTIC POLITICAL CONCERNS
--------------------------------
 
¶3. (C) Defense Minister Lee spent a large portion of the
meeting conveying to the Ambassador the domestic political
difficulties of the Lee Myung-bak Government. Referring to
the summer's anti-U.S. beef protests as a very heavy
experience, Lee cautioned that great care be taken in
addressing defense cost-sharing, USFK realignment and camp
returns, saying we must keep our heads cool so as not to give
any excuses to anyone waiting to work up anti-American
elements in Korea. Koreans understood that we must have
cost-sharing, but they now demanded transparency on how it
was used. Korean society had changed in that regard in
recent years; the ROKG must be mindful because the National
Assembly had more control over the LMB Administration than
our own Congress had over our Executive Branch. Maybe Korea
had problems with its democratic development, he mused, but
that was the reality of the situation today.
 
-------------------------
DEMOCRACY IS OUR STRENGTH
-------------------------
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador acknowledged that democratic systems
could complicate the work of governments, but added that the
U.S.-ROK relationship would not be nearly as close if we were
not both democracies. Democracy was the basis of the
U.S.-ROK alliance and the foundation for the 21st Century
Strategic Alliance we seek to build. When she last lived in
Korea the relationship was primarily viewed through the lens
of our military alliance and interactions Koreans had with
Americans were most often with members of our armed services.
Today, the alliance had added major economic and cultural
dimensions, and a much broader range of people-to-people
interactions between Koreans and Americans occur every day,
particularly with so many Koreans now living, working and
studying in the United States. She invited the Minister to
share his thoughts with her in the future on how we could use
that broader and deeper base of U.S.-ROK support to
strengthen our overall alliance relationship.
 
--------------------------------------------- ----
WE MUST FOCUS ON MUTUAL BENEFITS AND TRANSPARENCY
--------------------------------------------- ----
 
¶5. (C) Lee Sang-hee related that he had explained the ROKG's
domestic political problems to Secretary Gates at SCM and
that the Secretary had promised to provide him with plenty of
good ammunition for making a strong case for the alliance.
We had to show mutual benefit and transparency, Lee advised.
As an example of transparency, he praised the follow-up
information he had been provided by USFK after the SCM on its
plans to use the approximately USD 1 billion of accumulated
burden-sharing funds for base relocation construction
projects over the next year. But the ROK also needed to know
how much interest had accumulated on those funds, and how
much longer USFK planned to use burden-sharing funds for
completion of the Land Partnership Plan (LPP) base
consolidation and relocation project. Commenting on a Yonhap
article from that morning reporting that the U.S. and ROK
were at odds over the base relocation schedule, the Minister
stated that it was the ROK's firm view that we must complete
the LPP by 2014. The reason he gave was that local and
regional governments had to prepare for the base relocation
and that they would agitate if the project did not proceed on
schedule.
 
--------------------------------------------- -------
MAKING A CONVINCING CASE FOR A 21st CENTURY ALLIANCE
--------------------------------------------- -------
 
¶6. (C) Turning from a discussion of opponents to supporters,
 
Defense Minister Lee assured the Ambassador that Korean
"conservatives" would work to keep the alliance strong. He
and the ROK leadership intended to focus on a message
conveying clear values that would help to overcome opposition
and endure hardship. To do that he advocated:
 
1) that we evolve out of our military-heavy alliance by
emphasizing more political and cultural understanding; and
2) that we work to expand the range of the alliance beyond
Korea by enhancing our regional and global cooperation.
 
As I told Secretary Gates, "We must go together into that
future," Lee concluded.
 
¶7. (SBU) The Ambassador pledged to work with the Minister of
National Defense to do that, especially by building support
for the alliance among Korea's younger generation.
STEPHENS