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  기 밀 SEOUL 001059


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 07/06/2019


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  태그: PROP²⁾, PREL³⁾, KN⁴⁾, KS⁵⁾


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  제 목: 한국계 미국 학자 박한식, ‘자문’ 제공 위해 평양행


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  분류자: 정치 공사 참사관 조셉 윤⁶⁾. 근거 1.4(b/d)


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/10/14 21:55

1. 
   
   [한겨레가 만난 사람] 박한식 교수 한겨레

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001059
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2019
TAGS: PROP [Propaganda and Psychological Operations], PREL [External Political Relations], KN [Korea (North)], KS [Korea (South)]
SUBJECT: KOREAN-AMERICAN ACADEMIC HEADS TO PYONGYANG TO
GIVE "COUNSEL"
 
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
 
¶1. (C) Summary: On July 1, Professor Han S. Park from the
University of Georgia met with Pol M/C to brief us on his
upcoming visit to Pyongyang. Park said that he had made
frequent trips to the DPRK and had deep connections with its
leaders and members of the Asia Pacific Peace Committee and
the Foreign Ministry. Park relayed that the DPRK leadership
had been disappointed by the Obama administration's lack of
direct engagement. They also found the administration's
insistence on North Korea's return to the Six-Party Talks
(6PT) to be unacceptable. Park's view was that there was
little or no likelihood for the DPRK to return to the 6PT;
there had to be a completely new round of multilateral talks
or just bilateral talks with the United States. Park also
observed that the DPRK is currently being run with an agenda
designed by and for the military and they would not deviate
from their plans. He did not believe that the DPRK is
practicing gamesmanship or testing boundaries with the
missile launches and nuclear tests but that their actions
were being driven by internal turmoil. The DPRK leadership
was on a proscribed course and they intend to follow through.
Park said he would also seek to meet with the two detained
U.S. journalists; he would tell the North Korean authorities
that nothing good could come from holding them longer. DPRK
was looking for a way to resolve the situation but must "save
face." Park said he would check in with post upon his return
from Pyongyang, on or around July 10. End Summary.
 
------------------------------
Professor Park's Relationships
------------------------------
 
¶2. (C) Pol M/C on July 1 met with North Korea expert Han S.
Park who teaches at the University of Georgia and also serves
as the Director of the Center for the Study of Global Issues.
A widely recognized authority on North Korea, with friendly
relations with many North Korean cadres and leaders, Park
contacted Pol M/C to brief us on the issues that he would
raise during his upcoming trip, July 4-8, to Pyongyang. Park
said that he had been to North Korea over 40 times and had
deep, long-term relationships with people in the DPRK's
Foreign Ministry and members of the Asia Pacific Peace
Committee who also have influence with the leadership. Park
specifically named Han Song-ryol, Li Gun and Kim Gye-kwan of
the Foreign Ministry as persons with whom he had a close
relationship. He also named Pak Ki-byun and Li Jyon-pyo Qm
the Asia Pacific Peace Committee as close contacts. Park
noted that Li Jyon-pyo in particular was very well connected
with the leadership in Pyongyang, especially Kim Jong-il.
Park said he would depart Seoul for Beijing on July 2 where
he would obtain a visa to travel to Pyongyang, and leave
Beijing on July 4, stay in the DPRK until July 8 then fly to
Shenyang to meet with Chinese authorities. On July 9, Park
plans to return to Seoul and requested a meeting with Emboffs.
 
----------------------------------------
Current Relations and Military Influence
----------------------------------------
 
¶3. (C) Park said that relations between the United States,
ROK and DPRK were rapidly deteriorating, possibly the worst
he had seen for some time. When asked why Pyongyang shut
down talks when the new U.S. administration was ready to
engage, Park said that Pyongyang alone was not responsible
for the decision and that at the moment decisions in North
Korea were made by and for the military. Park said the
atmosphere in Pyongyang was initially hopeful that the new
U.S. administration would directly engage the leadership and
open a dialogue, but the USG made no move to engage and
"acted like it didn't know what to do" with the DPRK for
months. Still, Park said, Pyongyang had made a serious
mistake in making premature judgments of the new U.S.
administration, resulting in the missile launch and second
nuclear test, but that the DPRK military was simply following
a schedule that was laid out some time ago. Park
characterized the military's thinking as one-track with no
room for re-adjustment. In Park's estimation, many of
Pyongyang's actions were dictated by their current domestic
situation. Park did not believe that the DPRK was practicing
gamesmanship in an attempt to bait the USG or test the ROK.
The DPRK "does not have that kind of maneuvering room" and
there was no margin for error. All of these actions were a
"script designed by the military" and the leadership was
carrying it out. The leadership in Pyongyang was more than
capable of critical analysis and they realize their
shortcomings, but it was impossible to express this through
the chain of command. However, Park also characterized the
regime as having a "kamikaze" mentality.
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------
Succession, Deficiencies and the Legacy of Kim Il-sung
--------------------------------------------- ---------
 
¶4. (C) On the issue of succession, Park said that Kim
Jong-un was designated as the heir because of "clear
deficiencies" in the other two sons who were too well known
and have too much "baggage." According to Park, the
succession would not be too turbulent and Kim Jong-un would
not have much power. His position would be largely symbolic
and he would be controlled by others in Pyongyang; the DPRK
would move towards a more collective leadership.
 
¶5. (C) The true leader in North Korea remained Kim Il-sung,
because the DPRK was still following his policies, thoughts
and writings. Park called the regime a theocracy pointing
out that official documents must measure the year in terms of
Kim Il-sung's birth. For example, the year 2009 is
considered Juche minus 3 because we are currently three years
away from celebrating what would be the centenary of Kim
Il-sung's birth.
 
-----------------------------
Two AMCIT Journalists and 6PT
-----------------------------
 
¶6. (C) Park mentioned that as the trial of the two AMCIT
journalists was over, the situation was no longer in the
hands of the military only; others may be able to influence
the process. On this trip he would see what could be done
now that the trial was over. The DPRK leadership was looking
for a face saving way out of the dilemma.
 
¶7. (C) On the Six-Party Talks, Park believed that the DPRK
would not return to the table. They never wanted to be a
part of it and were lured in by the rewards and the boost in
international image, but their attitude soured because
promised benefits did not materialize. During the 6PT,
Pyongyang also felt quite isolated and ganged up on by the
five parties. Perhaps there could be "multilateral talks,"
but that must include a new structure or a new roster of
member states. Above all, the North Koreans wanted bilateral
talks with the United States.
 
¶8. (C) COMMENT: Professor Park has a long history of
contacts with North Korea officials. Not surprisingly, Park
can often appear more of an apologist for North Korea than an
analyst. Still, we have found his views generally helpful in
understanding North Korean thinking and motives. More than
that, we hope that Park can convey some of his broader, more
realistic perspectives he has acquired from living and
teaching in Georgia over the past 40 years.
STEPHENS