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  기 밀 SEOUL 001122


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 07/15/2019


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  태그: PROP²⁾, PREL³⁾, PINR⁴⁾, KS⁵⁾, KN⁶⁾


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  제 목: 조지아 대학 박한식 교수, 북한 방문 설명


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  참조: 09SEOUL1059


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  분류자: 스티븐스 대사. 근거 1.4(b/d)


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/10/13 00:29

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 001122
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: PROP [Propaganda and Psychological Operations], PREL [External Political Relations], PINR [Intelligence], KS [Korea (South)], KN [Korea (North)]
SUBJECT: PROFESSOR HAN PARK ON HIS TRIP TO PYONGYANG
 
REF: 09SEOUL1059
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephens. Reasons 1.4(b/d)
 
¶1. (C) Summary: In a July 13 office call, Professor Han S.
Park briefed the Ambassador on his July 4-8 visit to
Pyongyang during which he had lengthy discussions on the
welfare of the two detained AMCITS and the Six-Party Talks.
Park's principal interlocutors were the top three officials
of the Asia-Pacific Peace Committee: KIM Young-guen, LI
Jong-hyuk and WON Dong-yon. Regarding the two AMCIT
journalists, North Korean officials conveyed that they were
well, detained in a guest house in Pyongyang. Characterizing
U.S.-DPRK relations as in a state of war, North Korean
officials told Park that the journalists had committed
hostile actions; they were like prisoners of war. POWs
should be treated "humanely." If they are to be released,
they should be "amnestied;" "humanitarian" release was not
applicable, according the Park's North Korean interlocutors.
Park believed that the developments over the past few days,
including the phone call from one of the detained journalists
to a family member, and the Secretary's characterization of
the detainees' remorse, were all positive signs. Park said
he tried to steer the North Koreans away from thinking the
USG would issue an official apology. Park's North Korean
interlocutors were adamant that the Six-Party Talks were
over. The North Koreans wanted direct bilateral talks with
the United States; they were willing to tolerate multilateral
talks, provided the Washington-Pyongyang negotiations were
the centerpiece. The North Koreans told Park that they could
still denuclearize as this was Kim Il-sung's wish, provided
all of the Korean Peninsula was denuclearized. Park
indicated he was organizing a seminar to be held in early
October in the United States that would include scholars and
political figures from North Korea, South Korea and the
United States. End Summary.
 
-----------------------
Professor Park's Return
-----------------------
 
¶2. (C) University of Georgia Professor Han S. Park called on
the Ambassador on July 13 to brief her on his July 4-8 visit
to Pyongyang. On this trip Park spoke with KIM Young-guen
(Chairman of Asia Pacific Peace Committee; this organization
is in charge of inter-Korean relations), LI Jong-hyuk (Deputy
Chairman of the APPC) and WON Dong-yon (Director General of
the APPC). According to Park, Chairman Kim had frequent
contacts with Kim Jong-il and DG Won had a "direct line" to
the military. He also met with several unnamed scholars, who
discussed with Park a range of issues, including succession
and the "military first" policy.
 
-----------------
AMCIT Journalists
-----------------
 
¶3. (C) On the topic of the two detained journalists,
Professor Park's estimation was that North Koreans were
interested in seeing them released. APPC officials conveyed
to Park that technically, the DPRK was still at war since no
peace treaty was signed. This made the crossing of the DPRK
border a "hostile act." Upon capture the journalists became
POWs, who could not be released on humanitarian grounds. If
they were to be released, it would have to be considered an
amnesty and a "friendly gesture" to the American people, not
a humanitarian act. However, the professor's contacts did
stress that the journalists were being well-treated and that
they were still being kept in a guest house in Pyongyang
rather than in a prison or a labor camp. Park urged them to
show more public signs that the journalists were well
treated, to which his contacts responded that they did not
know what more they could do. The journalists had been
allowed phone calls, prompt delivery of medications sent from
their families, and were cared for at the guest house instead
of a prison.
 
¶4. (C) Park's APPC contacts also said that a special envoy
could be helpful on the matter. Park said he downplayed to
his interlocutors the possibility of an official USG apology
but said the leadership seemed willing to accept an official
delegation as long as it was not tied to the Six-Party Talks.
Park noted that his interlocutors expressed surprise that no
USG official inquiry had been made into direct negotiations
for the journalists. Perhaps, whatever inquires may have
been made by the USG may have gone to less powerful
organizations with no influence, Park guessed.
 
¶5. (C) Park said he felt that the Secretary's latest remarks
and the journalists' expressed remorse were good signs.
While the remarks alone may not get them released, it should
have gotten their attention, helpful in finding a face saving
way for the North Koreans.
 
-----------------------
No More Six-Party Talks
-----------------------
 
¶6. (C) Park's contacts were unanimous in insisting that the
DPRK would not return to the Six-Party Talks. The leadership
wanted direct, bilateral meetings with the United States.
The DPRK would be willing to accept multilateral talks if
specific issues called for it, but would not return to the
same 6PT format with the same line up of countries. Park
discussed some of the possible topics of these talks with his
sources and they said it might include practical matters like
trade, PSI, sanctions, disarmament and denuclearization.
 
-------------------------------------
Kim Jong-Il and Successful Succession
-------------------------------------
 
¶7. (C) Park assessed a different attitude among his North
Korean interlocutors on succession. This was no longer a
forbidden subject. To be sure, they would not openly discuss
the topic, but they did not stop Park from painting various
succession scenarios, even affirming them through body
language. Through this type of communication, Park believed
that his contacts were aware that KJI's third son, Jong-un,
would succeed his father. In general, Park's interlocutors
were not worried about a turbulent succession. His scholarly
contacts believed that as long as the successor inherited Kim
Il-sung's "thought, character and leadership," he would be
able to lead the country. The new leader would "follow the
manual" laid out by Kim Il-sung, and he would do well. In
this context, Park's contacts opined that the DPRK still
wanted a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, because Kim Il-sung
himself wanted this.
 
¶8. (C) Park said that he had issued invitations to North
Korean scholars for his "track 2" forum in the United States
this coming October. South Korean invitees include former
Prime Minister Han Myoung-sook and former National
Assemblyman Yoon Yeo-joon. Park would also like to invite
State Department officials.
STEPHENS