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  기 밀 SEOUL 003214


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  국방부망 배포¹⁾


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  국방부망 배포


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  버시바우 대사가 게이츠 국방장관에게²⁾


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  행정명령 12958: 비밀해제: 10/30/2017


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  태그: PREL³⁾, PARM⁴⁾, MARR⁵⁾, KS⁶⁾


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  제 목: 제39차 한미안보협의회의를 위한 게이츠 국방장관 방한의 무대연출


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  분류자: 알렉산더 버시바우 대사, 근거 1.4 (b,d).


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  번역자: PoirotKr (트위터 사용자명) — Micheal H. Rhee 2012/08/31 16:58

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 003214
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
FOR SECRETARY GATES FROM AMBASSADOR VERSHBOW
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2017
TAGS: PREL [External Political Relations], PARM [Arms Controls and Disarmament], MARR [Military and Defense Arrangements], KS [Korea (South)]
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GATES TO THE ROK FOR THE 39TH SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING
 
Classified By: Ambassador Alexander Vershbow, Reasons 1.4 (b,d).
 
------------------------
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION
------------------------
 
¶1. (C) Defense Minister Kim Jang-soo, your host for the 39th
Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) November 6-7, has done a
tremendous job in stabilizing the ROK-U.S. Alliance in his 12
months as Defense Minister. By helping to resolve the most
contentious issues (OPCON transfer, camp returns), he has
helped us keep the U.S. and our military relationship from
becoming a political football in the ongoing ROK Presidential
election campaign. Thanks to Minister Kim's cooperative work
with USFK, DOD and the Embassy, there are no major issues to
resolve at this SCM, and we suggest that your priority be to
prepare the ground for a smooth transition to the next Korean
Administration, which will take office in late February after
the election on December 19. In your meetings with Minister
Kim and President Roh, and especially in your public remarks,
we recommend that you highlight the continued importance that
the U.S. attaches to the ROK-U.S. Alliance and our long-term
commitment to maintaining peace and stability on the
Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.
 
¶2. (C) Minister Kim was previously ROK Army Chief of Staff,
and his strong military credentials have enabled him to
promote a more conservative, pragmatic, pro-Alliance approach
-- even though this has sometimes put him at odds with the
Blue House. Minister Kim's positive influence was evidenced
at the recent North-South Summit in Pyongyang, especially his
principled stance on preserving the status of the Northern
Limit Line (NLL), the de facto maritime boundary established
by the UN Commander after the Korean War, in the context of
proposals for a joint North-South fishing zone. We believe
Minister Kim will continue to be the voice of reason and
caution during the remaining months of the Roh
Administration, helping to keep up the momentum on Alliance
transformation as we transition to a new government. Right
now, he is working hard to overcome parliamentary opposition
to a one-year extension of the ROK troop presence in Northern
Iraq. He also has opposed Foreign Ministry proposals for a
major change in the burdensharing formula (SMA) that could
jeopardize funding for the relocation of U.S. forces to
Pyongtaek. In short, Minister Kim has stood up for the
Alliance in every instance and deserves your heartfelt
appreciation. END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION.
 
-----------------
POLITICAL OUTLOOK
-----------------
 
¶3. (C) The Republic of Korea is a new and a very lively
democracy. The outgoing government of President Roh
Moo-hyun, which has less than four months left in office,
reflects the larger tug-of-war going on within South Korean
society over many fundamental issues, including how to view
the country's own history, policy toward North Korea, and
relations with the U.S. and neighboring countries in the
region. Domestically, the country is split along regional
lines affiliated with traditional conservative and newer
progressive political perspectives. Roh's administration has
been led by a group of liberals who are products of the
democracy struggle of the 1980s and have largely followed the
policies of Kim Dae-jung, Roh's predecessor. After nearly
ten years of center-left policies, however, the Korean public
appears to be ready to see the country move back to the
center-right. This reflects a desire for more competent and
pragmatic leadership on the economy, and a more cautious
approach to North Korea based on reciprocity rather than
one-sided assistance.
 
--------------------------------------------- -
ROK PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS AND THE OPCON ISSUE
--------------------------------------------- -
 
¶4. (C) Current polls show the conservative Grand National
Party (GNP) candidate, former Seoul mayor and Hyundai CEO Lee
Myung-bak, maintaining a significant lead over the main
liberal candidate of the ruling United New Democratic Party
(UNDP), Chung Dong-young, a former Unification Minister and
TV anchorman. While both candidates declare themselves to be
 
pro-Alliance, Chung in recent days has broken with President
Roh in opposing the Iraq troop extension (with some of his
aides admitting that the aim is to win votes by fanning
anti-American sentiments). Ironically, opposition candidate
Lee is backing the Blue House. As noted, Defense Minister
Kim is working to persuade moderate UNDP members to support
the extension. In public remarks, we suggest that you
welcome the ROK government's readiness to extend the
deployment, note the important role their Zaytun unit plays,
while acknowledging the National Assembly's constitutional
right to make the final decision.
 
¶5. (C) On other issues of concern to the U.S., the
conservatives advocate delaying OPCON transfer until after
the DPRK denuclearization issue has been resolved at the Six
Party Talks (6PT). When the OPCON debate first began, the
conservatives were against the whole idea, seeing it as a
lessening of the U.S. commitment to the ROK as a result of
years of Alliance mismanagement by successive liberal
administrations. To President Roh and the progressive UNDP,
OPCON transfer represents a culmination of years of effort to
regain ROK sovereignty and establish an equal footing in the
Alliance. Of course, the reality is that OPCON transfer
should proceed because it serves both ROK and U.S. interests:
it is healthy for Korea to assume primary responsibility for
its own defense; but continued combined planning and
exercises will ensure that our two militaries are
collectively able to deter or defeat any North Korean
aggression.
 
¶6. (C) We expect the conservatives, if elected, can be
persuaded not to reverse the OPCON decision. Positive
statements on your part that OPCON transfer reflects the
increased strength and quality of the ROK military, but does
not in any way diminish the U.S. readiness to support its
Korean allies in any contingency, can help ensure that we
realize these important changes to the ROK-U.S. Alliance.
 
-----------------------
ALLIANCE TRANSFORMATION
-----------------------
 
¶7. (C) The ROK-U.S. Alliance remains strong and relevant
because it has been evolving since the Korean War and
continues to evolve today. Fundamental steps in this
transformational process occurred with the deployment of ROK
combat forces to Vietnam in 1965, the activation of the
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command in 1978, and the return of
peacetime OPCON of ROK forces to the Koreans in 1994. The
Alliance is not only evolving, but growing stronger with the
current effort to realign U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) into two
less intrusive hubs on the Korean peninsula, the continued
modernization of ROK and U.S. forces in the region, the
transfer of key missions and tasks from U.S. to ROK forces,
and the planned transfer of wartime OPCON. The Security
Policy Initiative (SPI) process has been a valuable and
effective instrument for shaping and implementing decisions
on Alliance transformation.
 
¶8. (C) The Korean public, skeptical of the Alliance five
years ago and unnerved when some of the changes were first
proposed, has responded positively to Alliance transformation
efforts. Recent polls show that a solid majority (60
percent) of South Koreans have an overall favorable opinion
of the United States, with an increased majority (65 percent,
up from 56 percent in 2006) also saying that the ROK-U.S.
security Alliance is in good shape. Even larger majorities
(75 percent) support the maintenance of U.S. troops on the
peninsula, with 68 percent also saying that South Korea
should maintain the security alliance with the U.S. even
after unification. This reflects renewed appreciation on the
part of the Korean public of the role the U.S. plays in
balancing the rise of China (and Japan), greater skepticism
about North Korean intentions after last year's nuclear and
missile tests, as well as the positive impact of Alliance
transformation initiatives themselves. More and more Koreans
see the U.S. as a reliable ally, but one that is prepared to
treat the Republic of Korea as an equal rather than junior
partner in the 21st century. Maintaining these high ratings,
of course, will require continued progress on issues like
OPCON transfer and USFK realignment, which symbolize both the
strength and adaptability of our Alliance.
 
 
--------------------------
NORTH-SOUTH SUMMIT FALLOUT
--------------------------
 
¶9. (C) The October 2-4 Inter-Korean Summit, the second summit
meeting between the North and South, was a much-anticipated
and watched event in the ROK. Although the results of the
summit were more symbolic than substantive, there are several
summit initiatives that could affect the Alliance in the near
and long term.
 
NLL:
----
 
¶10. (C) The near-term issue will be the upcoming discussions
between the North and South on the status of the Northern
Limit Line (NLL) as the sides seek to set up a "Peace Zone,"
including a joint fishing area, in the Yellow Sea (what
Koreans call the West Sea). While Defense Minister Kim has
repeatedly stated that the NLL is essential for ROK security
and cannot be negotiated away except as part of a final peace
settlement, the North Koreans have signaled that changing the
NLL is the precondition to implementation of the "Peace
Zone." The Blue House and Unification Ministry may be
tempted to cave in to this demand in the hope of achieving an
early breakthrough that could help the liberal Presidential
candidate.
 
¶11. (C) The North-South Prime Ministerial Meetings to discuss
the "Peace Zone" are scheduled for November 14-16 in Seoul,
following the SCM. These meetings will be followed by
Defense Ministerial Meetings in late November in Pyongyang to
coordinate the security aspects of the joint fishing area
(i.e., the NLL). Defense Minister Kim is our ally on this
issue, and he has pledged that he will block any steps that
would alter the NLL without proper coordination with United
Nations Command (UNC), the entity that established it. You
might, however, underscore the necessity of coordination with
UNC when you meet President Roh. Until this coordination has
been conducted and a consensus ROK internal policy is
formulated, we recommend not commenting publicly on the NLL
to the extent possible.
 
PEACE REGIME:
-------------
 
¶12. (C) The long-term initiative from the summit is to
continue a dialogue on establishing a peace regime on the
Korean peninsula. The end product would be a peace treaty
signed by the directly related parties, the ROK, DPRK, United
States and China, to replace the Armistice of 1953. The U.S.
position, as expressed by the President in Sydney, is that a
Peace Treaty will only be possible when Kim Jong-Il
verifiably gives up his nuclear weapons and nuclear programs.
This is also the approach envisaged in the September 2005
Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks. We have also said
that the commencement of negotiations should await the
completion of the disablement of DPRK nuclear facilities and
issuance of a complete declaration of the North's nuclear
holdings (both goals for the end of this year).
 
¶13. (C) The Blue House -- again in the hopes of making an
early splash that could influence the election -- has been
promoting the idea of an early four-way summit meeting that
would issue a "Declaration of the End of the Korean War" as
part of the launch of negotiations on a peace treaty. We
have argued that the war can only end with the peace treaty
itself, that signature of the peace treaty can only happen
when there is denuclearization, and that a four-party summit
is inconceivable as long as Kim Jong-Il retains his nuclear
weapons. You may be called upon to reiterate this in plain
language to President Roh. (Again, Defense Minister Kim is
very much an ally on this subject, but he does not exercise
much influence on issues relating to the Six Party Talks.)
In public statements, since this is a volatile ROK domestic
political issue, we suggest you simply express support for
lasting peace on the Peninsula, which we have kept for over
half a century, but reaffirm the President's position that
peace will not be possible as long as nuclear weapons
threaten the Peninsula.
 
-----------------------------
SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING
-----------------------------
 
¶14. (C) Last year's SCM brought a strong message: that OPCON
transfer can and should be accomplished in a manner that
strengthens the Alliance. With the contentious date for
transfer to the ROK of wartime OPCON now set for April 17,
2012, the primary focus at this year's SCM will be your
concurrence, along with Defense Minister Kim's, on the
implementation steps taken to date. Based on preliminary
discussions with ROK MND, Defense Minister Kim looks forward
to a very positive SCM and stated that he was very satisfied
with the progress being made on OPCON transfer. Minister Kim
agreed that it would be advantageous to highlight that joint
success at the SCM.
 
¶15. (C) This year's SCM will ensure that our Alliance and our
continued relationship remain viable and relevant for years
to come. Continued frank discussions on such topics as North
Korea security issues, the ROK-U.S.'s Alliance role in future
security environments, and our mutual cooperation in fighting
the Global War on Terror, will ensure that our Alliance is
prepared to face any emerging challenges.
 
¶16. (U) The public message from this SCM should be that,
while this is a dynamic time on the peninsula and in
Northeast Asia, our Alliance and our steadfast relationship
are the foundations that enable success in the political,
economic, social and cultural realms. The SCM is another
demonstration of how the ROK-U.S. Alliance has withstood the
test of time, even through periods of crisis such as last
year's DPRK nuclear test. Evolution of the security
arrangements within the Alliance is natural and strengthens
our security on the peninsula and in the region. Together,
we have ensured peace and prosperity on the Korean peninsula
for over 50 years. And together, we will ensure that this
peace and prosperity will be enjoyed by future generations.
 
¶17. (U) We look forward to seeing you in Seoul on November 6.
VERSHBOW